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This study analyzes United States foreign policy toward
Communist China in the transitional period since 1966, based
on the American China experts' writings in journals deali7ig
with international affairs and their views expressed in Congressional hearings.

The contents explain the changing of

American policy toward China from "containment without isolation" toward a rapprochement with Peking and progress toward normalization.

The achievement of normalization has been

a basic policy goal of the United States and has received bipartisan support, but the formula to accomplish normalization
still remains obscure, due mainly to the settlement of the "Taiwan question."
The essay includes four parts: (1). The introduction provides a general review of United States policy toward Peking
since the establishment of the People's Republic of China; (2).
Chapter I analyzes and explains the reasons for the Nixon Administration seeking a new approach to Peking; (3). Chapter II
reports on American and Chinese signals of their willingness
to pursue rapprochement and improve their relations; (4). Chapter III describes the American normalization process with China since the 1972 Shanghai Communique and the obstacles to the

development of normalization; (5). Chapter IV concludes with
speculation on future United States policy toward China.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE

.

•

INTRODUCTION

•

•

.

•
•

•
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

iii

•

•

. .

•

•

1

•

.

.

13

Chapter
I.

CAUSES OF THE RAPPROCHEMENT

•

Consolidation of the Peking Regime
Mutation of the International Political System
The Sino-Soviet Conflict
United States' Dis-entangling from Vietnam
Changing Chinese Image in Congress and the Public
II.

THE BREAKTHROUGH

. .

•

•

•

•

66

Mutual Signals for Rapprochement
Public Sign and Secret Preparation
The President's Visit: The Shanghai Communique
III.

TOWARD NORMALIZATION: PROCESS AND OBSTACLES

98

Formalization of the Contacts: The Liaison
Offices
Standstill in the Normalization Process
Arguments for Completion of Normalization
IV.
•

•

CONCLUSION
•

•

•
•

•

•
•

•

•

•

.

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

135
•

•

•

APPENDICES

. .

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

A.

The Text of the Joint Communique Issued at Shanghai

B.

Text of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United
States and the Republic of China

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

. . . . .

•

•

. .

141

144

PREFACE
The purpose of this paper is to study United States' foreign policy toward Communist China since the Nixon Administration made a new approach to Peking.

The momentous change

of relations between Washington and Peking has brought about
a new situation in the Pacific-Asian area and even in world
politics.

But it also creates a great challenge to the Chi-

nese people on Taiwan.

The research might be an aid to fur-

ther perceive the future developments of the relations between Washington and Peking.
The resources available at Western Kentucky University
have been a great convenience in conducting this study.

I

would like to express my sincere thanks to my thesis advisory committee: Dr. Georg Bluhm, Dr. John D. Parker, and Dr.
John H. Petersen.

They have endeavored to aid my thesis-

writing with their intelligent advice and counsel.

Also my

thanks are extended to Mr. Gene Whicker, who has guided me
in the use of Government documents regarding my subject, facilitating the completion of my essay.

S. I. Chang
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INTRODUCTION
In 1972, Richard Nixon was the first American President
in the country's history to pay a state visit to Mainland China, a nation with which the United States has had no diplomatic
relations since 1949.

His visit marked a turning point in the

United States policy toward China.

The breakthrough of rap-

prochement with China as a result of the visit has been regarded as one of the major achievements in his foreign policy-making.
In the announcement of the visit on July 15, 1971, President
Nixon stated that the trip "is to seek the normalization of relations between the two countries and also to exchange views on
1
questions of concern to the two sides." The announcement denoted that the normalization of relations with China had been a
2
vested policy prior to his "journey for peace." Thus, since
1971, the relations between the United States and China have
undergone a drastic change.
Ever since the Chinese Communists took over Mainland China through revolutionary force and established the People's Republic of China (PRC) on October 1, 1949, the question of recognition of the communist regime has plagued American policy-

1"President Nixon Announces Acceptance of Invitation To
Visit People's Republic of China," Department of State Bulletin
65 (July-Dec. 1971): 121.
(Hereafter referred to as "Nixon's
announcement to visit China").
2
Ibid.
1

2
makers.

The Truman Administration withheld recognition to de-

termine if the new communist regime would live up to the international obligations used as the criteria for extending recognition.
America.

However, the Peking regime proved itself hostile to
The emerging Chinese leader Mao Tse-tung, while de-

crying the United States as the "only one great imperialistic
power," proclaimed that China would "lean to the side of the
3
Soviet Union." Moreover, United States diplomats on the Mainland were mistreated and even arrested and public and private
4
property of America was confiscated. Under such circumstances,
American diplomatic officials were withdrawn from the Mainland
on January 14, 1950.

Secretary Acheson indicated to the Senate

Foreign Relations Committee on May 29, 1950, that "I see no
5
prospect" of America recognizing Communist China. Assistant
Secretary Dean dusk re-affirmed the United States policy to
Peking in 1951: "We do not recognize the authorities in Peping
for what they pretend to be....We recognize the national Govern3
U.S. Government Printing Office, The United States And
Communist China in 1949 and 1950: The Question of Rapprochement
And Recognition, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1973), pp.11-12.
(Hereafter referred to as U.S.China in 1949-50).
4
For example, American Consul General Angus Ward and some
of his staff at Mukden were arrested in November, 1949. They
were found guilty of spying. China confiscated American property amounting to 197 million.
5
U.S.-China in 1949-50, p. 18.

3
6
ment of the Republic of China." From then on, "non-recognition"
characterized the United States posture to China on the Mainland.
Communist China's adherence to Marxist-Leninist doctrine
and her

close alliance

with the Soviet Union in the 1950's

had been seen as proof of the communist expansion and conspiracy over the world.

The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 in

which a tremendous number of Communist China's "volunteers" was
brought into action had increased the hostility between the two
countries.

The Taiwan Strait crisis of 1954 ignited by the Chi7
nese indicated that their militant posture was unchanged. Un-

der these circumstances, a policy of "containment by isolation"
toward China evolved as a basic strategy in the Cold War, and
became the Asian counterpart to the containment policy against
Communist expansion in Europe.

Operationally, several bilater-

al and multinational mutual defensive agreements as instruments
of "the system of collective security in the Pacific area" were

6
United States Policy Toward China: A chronology-19411971,
(Hereafter referred to as U.S.-China Chronology), Appendix to U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. United States Relations with the People's Republic
of China. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations.
92nd Cong., 1st sess,1971.p.395.(Hereafter referred to as U.S.
Relations with China.)
71'he 1954 Taiwan Strait crisis resulted in the establishment of the 1955 Formosa Resolution in which President Eisenhower was authorized to employ forces to defend Taiwan, the
Pescadores and other "related positions and territories," implying the offshore islands controlled by the Nationalist Chinese.
The Formosa resolution was repealed in October 1974.

4
8
concluded with American allies in Asia. These non-communist
Asian governments were warmly endorsed by the United States,
and their inclinations--explicit or implicit--to establish
9
relations with PRC were discouraged by America. Peking's
claim to China's seat at the United Nations would be refuted
for more than twenty years.

This rejection was inspired by

the United States which recognized the Republic of China on
Taiwan as the governement representing China as a whole.

Sec-

retary Dulles declared: "Peking's real Chinese Government, now
is the one remaining hope of millions
10
of Chinese on the Mainland...." Economically, the United States
based on Formosa, ...

8
President Eisenhower, in his message to the Senate in
1955, stated that the United States-Nationalist Chinese Mutual Defense Treaty, together with similar treaties of America with Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and Australia and
New Zealand, constituted "the system of collective security
in the Pacific area."
(Hereafter referred to as Eisenhower,
Message). For the text of this message, see Appendix 2 to U.S.
Congress, House, Committee on International Relations. United
States-Soviet Union-China: The Great Power Triangle. Hearings
before the Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy Research and
Development of the Committee on International Relations. 94th
Cong., Part II, 1975-76, p. 309.
(Hereafter referred to as
Great Power Triangle).
9For
example, the United States had convinced Japan to recognize the Taipei government of China in 1951-52, and not to
establish relations with Peking, by threatening that the Senate
would be requested to delay approving the U.S.-Japanese peace
treaty. See U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs.
The i,ew China Policy: Its Impact on the United States and Asia.
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs
of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. 92nd Cong., 2nd sess.,
1972, pp. 9-10.
(Hereafter referred to as New China Policy).
10
U.S.-China Chronology, p. 397.

-

5
imposed a total embargo on China; cultural and other contacts
were cut off between Lhe two people

President Kennedy said in

1962: "Our problem now..., in a sense a major problem, is how
we can contain the expansion of communism in Asia so that_ we do
not find the Chinese Eloving out into a dominant position in all
of Asia with its hundreds and hundreds of millions of people in
11
Asia,...."
However, during the 1960's, fundamental changes in the international environment contributed to the evolution of a new
American China policy.

The bipolar system dominated by the

United States and USSR in 1950's had mutated into a multipol.ar
system, in which the increasingly integrated European Community
and Japan, both endowed with great economic and technological
potentials, became centers of power.

So did Mainland China

which emerged as a nuclear power in 1964.

Thus, "five-power"

structure had developed in the international arena.

Consider-

ing the rising power and prestige of China and her increasing
influence in international affairs, and the Sino-Soviet conflict
growing since the late 1950's, Washington's policy analysts and
counsels began to reappraise the American posture and attitude
toward the former adversary.
The international development obviously seemed to challenge
the concept and feasibility of "containment by isolation."
tainment of China had proven effective.

Con-

"After World War II,

we sought above all to contain communism expansion," said Sec-

11-Ibid., p. 403.

retary Kissinger.

6
12
But the iso"We essentially succeeded."

lation of China, which had been designed to "impair the legitimacy of the Communist government of China and bring it down
13
coupled with the American "non-recognition" policy,
was deemed a failure.

The Communist regime in China had been

stabilized over the years, and no chance was perceived to overthrow it.

Some American allies or non-communist countries had

established diplomatic ties with Peking.

Isolation had not

frustrated China's economic development; since the Sino-Soviet
schism, the Chinese leaders had based their programs primarily
on self-reliance and self-sufficiency.

They also began to es-

tablish trade relations with Western countries.

The United

States embargo on China had not bound its allies' trade with
14
As a result, America was losing rather than
the Chinese.
gaining under this policy.
Thus, ending the isolation would be a better alternative
policy toward China, whose main purpose would be to "promote
not a change of the system--which can be done only by war--but

12Henry A. Kissingerl "America and Asia: Security, Easing
Tensions and Cooperation, Vital Speeches of the Day,August
1976, p. 652.
13Akira Iriye. ed., U.S. Policy Toward China: Testimony
taken from the Senate Foreign Relationi Committee Hearings-1966, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968), p. 162.
14China's
s exports to non-communist countries such as Japan, Australia, Canada, West Germany, Britain, Italy, France,
and others, amounted to $ 637 million in 1960; $ 1,252 million;
imports from them, amounted to $ 767 million in 1960; $ 1,409
million in 1965. See Congressional Quarterly, China and U.S.
Foreign Policy, 2nd. ed., (Washington D.C.: Congressional
Quarterly, 1973), p. 162.

7
15
This was based on the presumed
a change within the system."
evolution of some East European countries, such as Rumania and
Yugoslavia who deviated gradually from the Soviet Union's domination as they gained increasing contact with the West.

"Con-

tainment without isolation" was considered and recommended as
a new policy toward Peking.

The changing views of China experts in mid-1960's on China more or less influenced the Johnson Administration.

Vice

President Humphrey stated that the American policy toward Pe16
king should be "containment without necessarily isolation."
President Johnson expressed his desire for "reconciliation
17
between the people of Mainland China and the world community."
Being a strong candidate for the nomination for president,
Richard Nixon also praised highly in 1967 the idea of "containment without isolation" as "a good phrase and a sound
18
However, Peking denounced it as "intensifying
concept."
19
the containment of China.
After the convulsions of the "Cultural Revolution"
(1966-69) were over, American China experts acknowledged a
more rational behaviour of Chinese leaders in international

15Iriye, p. 147.
16
Ibid., p. 204.
17Ibid.
18
Richard Nixon, "Asian After Vietnam," Foreizn Affairs
46 (October 1967): 123.
19U.S.-China Chronology, p. 406.

8
activities.

They expanded relations with more countries and

established more legations abroad.

A more conciliatory United

States posture to China might further

change Chinese be-

haviour, particularly while Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai were
still on the scene; since they had made no secret of their
strong feelings against the Russian "revisionists," and of
20
their wishes for flexible relations with the United States.
Another factor--and likely the most important one--for
the evolution of the U.S.-China relations was the continuous deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations.

The 1969 mili-

tary clashes on the eastern border of the two colossal communist countries, according to a Western analyst, were presumably ignited by Chinese pragmatists or moderates, for the
purpose of proving their claim that the Soviet Union, rather
than the United States, was China's "main antagonist," and
of supporting their position to begin a rapprochement with
21
the West, especially with the United States.
American analysts, in view of the Sino-Soviet relationship and of the uncertain outlook of detente with the Soviet Union, began to

20When Edgar
Snow visited the Mainland in 1970, he had
conversations with Mao and Chou. Both of them expressed
their new approaches to America. See two of his articles:
"A Conversation with Mao Tse-tung," Life, April 30, 1971,
pp. 46-48; and "Talk with Chou En-lai: The Open door," The
New Republic, March 27, 1971, pp. 20-24.
'
)1
f.oger Glenn Brown, "Chinese Politics and American Policy: A New Look at the Triangular," Foreign Policy, 23
(Summer 1976): 3-23.

9
contemplate a triangular relationship between Washington, Moscow, and Peking, in order to bring about a balance of powers
in the Pacific Ocean, assigning China a role as an important
counterbalance of the Soviet Union. American accommodation
with China would not only reduce the hostilities and misunderstandings between the two countries, but also counterpoise the
Soviet's threats in the Western Europe, in the Middle East,
and in the Asian region, thus bringing a new global structure
of stability.
Indicating America's opening to China, some preliminary
recommendations were made such as removing the United States'
travel restriction, ending the embargo on China, expanding
the exchanges of science, arts, culture, and sports, and accepting recognition of Mainland China at the United Nations.
The final goal would be the normalization of the AmericanChinese relations.

When President Nixon took office in Janu-

ary 1969, he started implementing those recommendations, first
taking step-by-step measures of friendship, and after receiving a favorable response from the Chinese, then taking a trip
to the Mainland.

His conduct of rapprochement with China re-

flected the crucial revision of "non-reco,„nition" policy,
symbolizing the end of the isolation of China.

The United

States containment policy was also obsolete; or the function
of containment was, at least, reduced substantially.

The

measurable capabilities of the Soviet Union and its unpredictable intentions inevitably made the Sino-Russian border
the overriding security problem and strategic concern of Peking.

This security had widely absorbed and bound China's

10
military capabilities.

It therefore seemed that the United

States did not need to contain China so much, since she was
mostly occupied with the security of the border with the Soviet Union.
President Nixon's visit to China resulted in the issuance of the Shanghai Communique constituting the basic principle of the United States normalization of relations with China.
Since then, normalization has been the main topic of the American policy toward China.

The normalization with China is re-

garded as being in the American interests and has been reaffirmed by the successive Administrations.

It is seen as an

alternative means to achieving world-wide equilibrium by containing the Soviet threats over the world.

It will further

trade and increase cultural exchanges between the two countries.
In a nutshell, the United States' direction to normalization
has been settled.

However, its process, depending on the "Tai-

wan question," still remains obscure.
The analysis of the views of the American China experts
will give insights on, and allow inferences regarding, the
arguments which the same experts can be expected to have made
in their advisement and counselling activities in the policyformulating process, whether at the White House, the Department of State, or Congressional hearings.

Most likely their

views have influenced some parts of the process of policymaking toward China.

China experts' views in the 1966 Senate

hearings recommending "containment without isolation" policy towards China were responded to by President Johnson, who said

11
at a news conference on the hearings that it was "good to have
the opinion of these professors and experts and ambassadors ..
22
"
Vice President Humphrey's suggestion of "containment
without necessarily isolation" as American policy toward China
"was taken by many observers as a significant shift of Administration policy towards China and followed closely similar recommendations made in the hearings before the Senate Foreign Re23
lations Committee."
The State Department organized in December 1966 an advisory panel on China, which was composed of ten
academic China experts.

Among them were Alexander Eckstein,

George E. Taylor, Robert A. Scalapino, A Doak Barnett, and
24
John K. Fairbank.
In the 1970 hearings of the Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Dr. Barnett's recommendations such as the removal of travel restrictions on China, approval of China's seat at the United Nations, and the end
of embargo on China, became Nixon Administration policy toward
25
China.
Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs,
Marshall Green, indicated that President Nixon's meeting with

22Congressional quarterly Inc., Congressional Almanac,
vol.
Almanac 89th Congress 2nd Session....1966 (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1967), p. 424.
23Ibid., p. 429.
24Iriye, p. 204.
25China and U.S. Foreign Policy, p. 64.

12
Mao and Chou in 1972 had been "long recommended by some
26
U.S.
scholars and Foreign Service professionals."
"China experts" in this thesis generally include those
who had published their writings in periodicals which deal with
international affairs and those who had expressed their views
before Congressional hearings.

They are not exclusively from

the academic fields; those who served with the Department of
State are also included.

This thesis is concerned mainly with

views which advocated new approaches to

and improved relations

with Communist China.
This thesis will study the analysis, arguments, and recommendations of the American China experts.

The period sur-

veyed begins with the middle 1960s, which saw the ending of
China's isolation and the initiation of rapprochement, then
proceeds to normalization, which has been proclaimed by both
the United States and China as their common goal.

This sub-

ject will be dealt with in two parts: one dealing with the
formulation, decision and implementation of the breakthrough
in a summit communication between the leaders of the two countries; the other dealing with the evolution of the AmericanChinese process of normalization since the Shanghai Communique of 1972.

26“
U.S. China Policy and the East Asia Community," Department of State Bulletin 66 (Jan.-June): 742.

CHAPTER

I

CAUSES OF THE RAPPROCHEMENT

To inquire into American foreign policy toward Communist
China in the transitional period, the motivations for American
policy-makers changing their postures to their former opponent seemed unlikely to be disregarded.

Some implications, in-

ternationally and internally, had contributed to their reassessment of Communist China.

The "Middle Kingdom" had been deviat-

ing from Soviet's diplomatic course, capable of independently
orienting its own policy.

Peking developed a more pragmatic

and active attitude toward world politics.

The split with

the Soviets was drawing more attention in United States decision-makers' thinking.

Peking's role in the international set-

ting was re-evaluated in the changing international situation.
On the part of American politics, the settlement of the
Vietnam War had been a pressing problem for each Administration
since 1965.

Not only had it re-oriented United States foreign

policy to Asia, but also it was interrelated with American policy toward Peking.

The attitudes of the American people to

the Chinese were also in transition.
of them was emerging.

A more favorable image

The Chinese on the Mainland were re-

garded as "hard-working, intelligent, artistic, progressive,
and practical," rather than "ignorant, warlike, sly, and
13

14
27
treacherous" as was measured in the 1960's.
The events or situations which had stimulated President
Nixon's decision to make rapprochement with China could be
grouped as follows:

Consolidation of the Peking Regime
The stability of the Peking regime over two decades accounted for an underlying factor of American decision-makers
to re-evaluate their approaches to Communist China.

Acknow-

ledging the "facts of life" on the Mainland, the United States
administration was preparing to take an initiative in its China policy.

"We undertook a new China policy in 1969," said
28
Secretary Rogers, "to deal with existing realities."
Generally, in the American China experts' judgements, the

Peking regime's existence was no longer a "passing phenomenon."
The survival of the Peking regime over years had proven that
the regime had been stabilized and that there was little opportunity to overthrow it.

Just as in other communist coun-

tries, on the Mainland, too, a strong totalitarian system
was established.

The entire Mainland had been effectively

controlled and unified.
Chinese leaders have been oriented with the Mao and Leninist doctrines.

They ruled 800 million people on the Mainland

27
Department of State Bulletin 73 (July-Dec. 1975): 534.
28u
Relating Our National Idealism To International Realities: Addressed by Secretary Rogers" Department of State
Bulletin 64 (Jan.-June 1971): 797.

15
on the basis of Mao Tse-tung's thought.

Traditional Confucian

social order had been replaced by Chairman Mao's brand of communism--the reconstruction of human nature by eliminating economic inequality, by mobilizing mass movement, and by cultivating a sense of community--to "serve the people."

Peking lead-

ers were seeking the Chinese people's support for the regime
by injecting the nationalism to build a "a new China" and appealing to the future accomplishments for their generations.
They had shown their mastery in resettling the people from
dense areas to frontier provinces, in mobilizing them to proceed with major projects, and in exploiting resources to rebuild the Mainland.
Although there had been some dissenters protesting against
the regime's ruling during the "hundred flowers" campaign (195657) and sporadic armed protests in the aftermath of the Great
Leap Forward (1957-60), the dissidents' dissatisfaction had been
lessened by the Chinese Communist Party's persuasion or coercion.
Non-communist groups had been disorganized so that the least
possibility was to form a nation-wide organization capable of
systematically implementing massive anti-communist activities
in the short or long run.

Even some strife had emerged between

different communist groups in the political leadership such as
moderates and radicals, which represented different views on
the question of how to modernize China.
did not jeopardize the communist regime.

Their power struggles
Dr. John M.H. Lind-

beck said, "There is no good evidence, so far as I can see,
that the continuity and basic stability of the regime is like-

16
29
ly to be jeopardized in the foreseeable future."
The prospects of overthrowing the regime from the outside,
particularly from its opponent, Nationalist China, struck the
China experts as even less likely.

Since Communist leaders

took over the Mainland, they had succeeded in purging or reeducating the former supporters of the Nationalist government.
"Most Sinologists agree that at least 1 million landlords and
Kuomintang officials were executed over the course of the next
six years (1949-55)."

Some other remaining Nationalist of-

ficials were sent to re-education

camp for "thought reform."

Communication with the Nationalists had been severed by the
regime, which had typically monopolized communication and information.

Although some small-scale military activities in

the 1960's had been initiated by the Nationalist Chinese on
the coastal provinces of the Mainland, they were deemed as
"hit and run" tactics posing no substantial threats to the
security of the regime.

Conclusively, China experts argued

that the regime of the Nationalists on the Mainland was ebbing
with the passing of

Nationalist Chinese were seen as
31
having lost "the Mandate on the Mainland."
One of those extime.

perts, Michel Oksenberg, said that "the Nixon Administration
indicated that it believed the Peking government, not Taipei,

29Iriye, p. 52.
30
"The Long March of Chairman Mao," Time, September 20,
1976, p. 42.
31Iriye, p. 55.

17
32
was the effective, long-term ruler of the nainland."
The fact that the Communist rule on the Mainland was consolidated led the China experts to endorse in the middle 1960's
the concept of "containment without isolation" replacing the
policy of "containment by isolation" which had been followed
since the Truman Administration.

They concluded that the tra-

ditional American policy of containment had been successful,
but isolation had failed.
The China experts believed that the containment of China
should remain the basic policy of the United States in the
Asian region, since many American allies in Asia shared the
same wish to contain China.

The United States, therefore,

should cooperate with them to curb Chinese military or subversive activities threatening the neighbouring countries.
Washington should continue to constrain the Chinese within
their present borders.

The attacks of North Korea on South

Korea, North Vietnam on South Vietnam, and Mainland China on
Taiwan should be halted by every means.

Dr. Lindbeck said that

"we have three points (Korea, Vietnam, and Taiwan) where military power is an important aspect of the situation, and we are
involved in containing the extensi-1 of military forces, Chi33
nese or not, beyond these borders." Just as was shown by the
effectiveness of containment policy in Europe, so too should
United States maintain military presence on the Asian conti-

32Michel Oksenberg, "The Strategies of Peking," Foreign
Affairs, 50 (October 1971): 16.
33
Iriye., p. 139.

18
nent.

Dr. Barnett indicated that "we are not going to abandon
34
a containment policy."
On the other hand, the policy of isolation was generally
regarded as a failure.

Communist China was not effectively

isolated from the outside world, but rather developed its relations with other communist countries, with some nations in
the Third World, and with some Western countries.

The total

embargo on China, imposed in 1950, as an economic instrument
designed for strengthening the isolation of China, retarding
her economic growth and therefore reducing "Communist China's
35
military potential in both the short and long run...."
had
been seen as ineffective in past years.

No American allies

save Nationalist China restricted their trade with the Mainland.

From the mid-1950's, American allies such as Britain,

Canada, Argentina, and Australia eased their restrictions on
trade with the Mainland.

Since the growing Sino-Soviet con-

flict, China switched her trade mainly to non-communist countries.

Germany and France founded a consortium to build a

steel plant in China; Japan also expanded trade with her.
Thus, Communist China acquired all the commodities she wanted from the Western countries save the United States.

In

1959, "70 per cent of its (Chinese) trading was with other
communist countries; today(1971), at logger-heads with Russia and communist countries that have taken Russia's side,

34Ibid., p. 130.
35
Ibid., p. 143.

19
Peking conducts 80 per cent of its overseas business with non36
communist nations."
One cause of the failure of the policy of isolation lay
in United States allies' lukewarm support.

The embargo had

also become a detriment to American business.

The Equal Ex-

port Opportunity Act of August 29, 1972 reported that "the
unwarranted restriction of exports from the United States has
37
of
payments..."
a serious adverse effect on our balance
The main purpose of ending the isolation of China, in the
views of the China experts, was to change China's hostile attitude.

De-isolation would induce Peking into the internation-

al community; China would be expected to reshape her role in
the world.

Dr. Fairbank stated that it was to "defuse or damp-

en Peking's militancy by getting China into greater contact
with the outside world, more connected with the international
scene and more interested in participating in it like other
38
The United States needed to encourage China's
countries."
contact with the nations, thereby solving "a host of international questions that cannot be resolved without Chinese par39
ticipation, including arms control and disarmament."

"The China Trade: How Big How Fast?" Newsweek, May 3,
1971, p. 71.
3
7Marian D. Irish and Eike Frank, U.S. Foreign Policy:
Context, Conduct, Content, (New York: Harcourt brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1975), p. 428.
38Iriye, p. 131.
39Ib1d., p. 146.
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To de-isolate China would be an answer to those countries
who had argued that "Chinese intransigence and militance is
largely the result of isolation by the United States.

We can

prove that they are wrong only by ending our policy of isola40
tion." Should Peking continue to pursue its isolation in spite
of American reconciliation, it would be Chinese obstinacy.
Also it would be a response to those countries who had expected that a change of America's attitude "could produce profound
41
change in Chinese behaviour."
"Containment by isolation" was originally designed more
42
on "fear than on reason" lest nuclear warfare should break out.
It was based on the view that Chinese militant postures were
threatening the neighbouring countries.

Therefore, China's

militancy should be contained with her present borders,
strengthened by the isolation of Peking from other countries.
However, previous practices, in the general views of China
experts, showed that the behaviour and posture of Communist
China actually were not aggressive nor expansive.
Traditionally, the Chinese were not categorized as aggressive people.

They employed armed forces to settle their

"lost territory" such as claiming to "liberate" Taiwan or revolt-pressing in Tibet and border conflicts with neighbouring

"Ibid.
41Lucian W. Pye, "China in Context," Foreizn Affairs 45
(January 1967): 242.
42John K. Fairbank, "The New China and the American Connection," Foreizn Affairs 51 (October 1972): 43.
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countries such as Russia and India.

Their intervention into

the Korean War was regarded as being the result of their national security being gravely threatened when General Douglas
MacArthur's troops neared the Yalu River, close to the Chinese industrial heartland.

China's endorsement of North Viet-

nam s engaging in the Vietnam War was an instrument of Peking's
"war of national liberation"; no Chinese troops had been involved in the Vietnam conflicts.
concerned, to

occupy a

As far as Chinese leaders were

foreign country with Chinese forces

was deemed as deviating from Mao's doctrine of "war of national liberation," which was mainly to assist an indigenous liberation movement in a country with Chinese arms and training,
rather than with Chinese troops.
Beyond that, China's military forces were not offensive
43
but defensive oriented. Her armed forces were mainly deployed on the northern border with the Soviets.

Air and maritime

forces were still vulnerable, posing no serious threats to
United States allies in Asia such as Japan, Australia, New
Zealand, Philippines, and Indonesia.

Given China's inferior

nuclear capability, her nuclear threats were minimal.

Pe-

king had repeatedly proclaimed her intent not to use nuclear
weapons first to settle conflicts in the international field.
American nuclear superiority had deterred the Russian nuclear
weapon's threats in the 1962 Cuba crisis, let alone Communist

43
A Doak Barnett, "A Nuclear China and U.S. Arms Policy,"
Foreign Affairs 48 (April 1970): 437.
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China's actions.

Dr. Allen S. Whiting said that "our deter-

rence, which has sufficed for the Soviet Union, should more
44
than suffice for China."
China

experts believed that Peking's self-restrained

behaviour would continue, and that post-Mao leaders would be
more pragmatic to develop state-to-state relationship and to
modernize China.

China's actors would be more rational.

Dr.

Barnett said that Chinese pragmatism and rationalism "have
been accepted by many as a basis for policy even within the
45
American government."
In this connection, Chine expPrt. recommended some steps
to take in the conduct of "containment without isolation,"
such as to remove the embargo, resume trade transactions with
the Mainland on strict non-strategic terms, encourage non-official contacts between the two countries, admit China into
the United Nations, acknowledge the Peking regime as the de
facto government of China, and then extend de jure recognition to Peking in the normalization of relations.
The idea of "containment without isolation" gained support among decision-makers in the Johnson Administration.
President Johnson expressed his desire to improve understanding with China: "We still look to the day when those on the
46
Vice
mainland of China are ready to meet us half-way...."

44Allen S. Whiting, "How Real Is It? That Chinese 'Threat"
The New Republic, April 3, 1971, p. 20.
45Barnett, "U.S. Arms Policy," p. 438.
46U.S.-China Chronology, p. 407.
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President Humphrey suggested the "containment without neces47
One of the ten
sarily isolation" policy toward China.
points of the United SL,Ites China policy proposed by Secretary Rusk in March 1966 stated that "when it can be done
without jeopardizing other U.S. interests, we should continue to enlarge the possibilities for unofficial contacts
48
The travel ban
between Communist China and ourselves...."
to China for doctors, medical scientists, scholars and writers was lifted for the first time by the Administration in
1966.
However, Peking denounced the United States new postures
with such expressions: "a flexible policy," "without isolation" and "more contacts" as only pretenses for intensifying
49
China was undergoing the trauthe 'containment' of China."
matic period of the "Cultural Revolution," Peking had isolated itself from the world.
Prior to assumption of the Presidency, Mr. Nixon also
supported the concept of de-isolation of China.

In the Octo-

ber 1967 issue of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Nixon published an
essay entitled "Asia After Vietnam." In this, he declared:
"The world cannot be safe until China changes.

Thus our aim,

to the extent that we can influence events, should be to in-

47Iriye, p. 204.
48
U.S.-China Chronology, p. 406.
49
Ibid.
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duce change. The way to do this to persuade China that it must
50
He further suggested the United States policy toward
change."
China in the short and long run: "For the short run, then, this
meansa policy of firm restraint, of no reward, of a creative
counterpressure designed to persuade Peking that its interests
can be served only by accepting the basic rules of international civility.

For the long run, it means pulling China back

into the world community--but as a great and progressing nation,
51
not as the epicenter of world revolution."
The United States took concrete measures to de-isolate China beginning with the Nixon Administration.

President Nixon

theorized an idea that negotiation, rather than confrontation,
would be a rationale guiding his policy toward Peking.

"After

a period of confrontation, we are entering an era of negotiation." he stressed at his inaugural address on January 20,
52
1969.
"When I spoke these lines," he reported to Congress in
1972, "I had the Peoples Republic of China very much in mind.
It is this attitude that shaped our policy from the outset and
led to the July 15, 1971 announcement.
53
that I go to Peking."

It is in this spirit

50Nixon, "Asia After Viet Nam," p. 121.

51-Ibid., p. 123.

5211The Inaugural Address of President Nixon," Department
of State Bulletin 60 (Jan.-June 1969): 122.
53"U.S. Foreign Policy For the 1970's. The Emerging Structure of Peace: A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States, February 9, 1972," Department of
State Bulletin 66 (Jan.-June 1972): 331. (Hereafter referred
to as Emerging Structure of Peace").
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Nutation of the International Political System
One of the main features of the world politics in the
1960's or even in the 1970's lay in the multipolar system
emerging in the structure of world peace.

The 1950's bi-

polar system of the two super powers of the United States
and USSR mutually influencing the world was being replaced
by a "five-power" structure.

This was caused mainly by the

United States gradually subsidizing and supporting the Western European countries and Japan to restore their economical
capabilities and political stabilities, and by the protracted cold war between Communist China and the Soviet Union.
In addition to the United States and USSR, Japan with economical and political influences in Asia, coupled with her
technological potentials; Western Europe proceeding to economical, and perhaps political, and military integration;
and Communist China with her growing nuclear capability, affluent resources, spacious territory, and world's largest
population, were becoming distinctive and independent centers
of power in the new international system.

"In the YEARS

ahead, the most profound challenge to American policy will
be philosophical": said Dr. Kissinger, "to develop some concept of order in a world which is bipolar militarily but
54
multipolar politically."
For the American decision-makers, the "five-power" strucLure appeared more flexible and more manageable for policy-

54 Henry A. Kissinger, American Foreizn Policy, Expanded
Edition, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1974), p. 79.
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formulating than the bipolar system.

President Nixon first

outlined the idea of a "five-power" structure at a news con55
ference at Kansas City on July 6, 1971.
While predicting
that Communist China would be "an enormous economic power,"
he indicated that within five, ten, or fifteen years, "five
great economic super powers" would comprise the United States,
Western Europe, the Soviet Union, China, and Japan, who would
determine the economic future. Economic power was "the key
56
to other kinds of power."
He further mentioned in 1972 his
idea of grand strategy among such five powers to "build a
structure of peace" for the world:
We must remember the only time in the history of the
world that we have had any extended periods of peace is
when there has been balance of power. It is when one nation becomes infinitely more powerful in relation to its
potential competitor that the danger of war arises. So
I believe in a world in which the United States is powerful. I think it will be a safer world and a better world
if we have a strong, healthy United States, Europe, Soviet
Union, China, Japan, each balancing the othgg, not playing one against the other, an even balance."
This policy of five balancing powers was intended to
achieve a situation in which no power would become dominant
thereby posing a profound threat to the others.

Secretary

Kissinger also remarked: "The central focus of U.S. foreign
policy is to help shape from this environment a new international

55
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structure, based on equilibrium rather than confrontation, linking nations to each other by practices of cooperation that re58
flect the reality of global interdependence."
A system of several centers of power would enable the
United States to play a more active role in developing its relations with four other powers.

Washington was in a position

to manipulate two basic sets of triangular relationships: the
triangle of the economic-industrial giants, the United States,
West Europe, and Japan; the new triangle of the United States,
the Soviet Union, and the Communist China.

Both triangles were

vital to the United States developing the new structure of
world peace which President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger had envisaged.
In developing United States relations with four powers in
the "five powers" structure, Washington's policy-makers and
China experts believed that while entering detente with American former adversaries of the Soviet Union and China, the
United States should further consolidate its relations with the
traditional allies in Western Europe and Japan.

It became a

cornerstone of American foreign policy to maintain such traditional triangular ties.

Since World War II, America had well-

es'ablished consolidating connections with Western Europe and
Japan based on the multilateral relations such as North Atlantic
Treaty

Organization (NATO) or bilateral associations the

United States-Japanese defense treaty, and some other formula

58

Henry A. Kissinger, "The Global Challenge: International
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of cooperation such as Coordinating Committee For Export to
59
The United States was the only powCommunist Areas (COCOM).
er which had alliance with both Western Europe and Japan.

They

had shared common interests: to develop an international system
to settle the world conflicts, to define common security, trade,
international monetary sy tern, to join technology and world energy resources.

Their relationships had been seen as unique

and long-standing.
On the other hand, the triangular relations between the
United States, the Soviet Union, and Communist China were of
a different nature.

In addition to hostile ideology overshadow-

ing their relationships, the Soviet's military build-up and
their world strategy had constituted the main threats to American security.

Russian nuclear capability was in near parity

with the United States; the Soviet's maritime expansion in the
Pacific Ocean and in the Indian Ocean was perceived as greatly
affecting the American interests in the Asian region, especially after the enunciation of the "Nixon Doctrine," indicating
lower American military commitment and possibly creating a vacuum in this area.
On the part of China, United States decision-makers were
reassessing China's role as one of the main actors in the new
structure, since Peking was emerging from isolation in the late
1960's.

Chinese polemics with USSR and the traumatic "Cultural

59COCOM, established in 1949, was an
informal working group,
comprising Japan and all NATO nations but Iceland. Its function
was mainly to decide the shipment of arms, military material,
fissionable materials, strategic goods to communist countries.
All the above shipment should be concurred by the members.
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Revolution" resulting in China's isolation from the outside
led Chinese leaders to acknowledge that isolation was threatening their security.
fairs.

They became active in international af-

They showed their interest in becoming a member of the

United Nations.

China was providing some countries is Asia

and in Africa with aid projects including the construction of
a 1100-mile railroad in Tanzania and Zambia.

The new posture

of Peking emerging from isolation changed the power structure
in Asia and in the world.
The impacts of the American long-range involvements in the
Vietnam War

had weakened United States abilities to work out

overseas commitments, particularly in Asia.

Domestic repercus-

sions to the warfare had restrained the United States from playing the role of a world policeman.

America was re-assessing

her ability and willingness to shoulder world-wide defensive
responsibilities.

President Nixon stressed: "America cannot--

and will not--conceive all the plans, design all the programs,
execute all the decisions and undertake all the defense of the
60
free nations of the world."
In Asia, China, as an emerging nuclear power with her strategic location and increasing antagonistic attitude toward the
Soviet Union would play a vital role in the structure of five
balancing powers.

Peking's nuclear capability of becoming "a

very significant nuclear power" within ten or fifteen years

60"
U.S. Foreign Policy For the 1970's: A New Strategy For
Peace, A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of
the United States, February 18, 1970," Department of State Bulletin 62 (Jan.-June 1970): 276.
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would be a deterrent to a Soviet surprise attack on the United
61
Peking would sense no safeguard if the United States'
States.
countervailing nuclear power were highly impaired.

China and

other countries would be blackmailed by Soviet nuclear hegemony.
Thus, to enhance Peking's role in the multipolarity world would
not only counterbalance Moscow's power but also reduce the
United States' international burdens in the Asian region.
The disparity of the economic potential and military capability of Japan, coupled with constant restriction on nuclear
programs from international pressures, or from constitutional
limitation (Article 9) or from public opposition, promoted China's role in the emergence of the "five powers" structure in
the international system.

During World War II, the Mainland

of China had been a main theater and a factor in the defeat of
Japan by constraining Japanese main forces on the Mainland.
Now it would be a vitally strategic location to counter Soviet
threats to the West and the East, and to partially contain Moscow's expansion.

The Soviet Union, in order to project its

power into Asia as a part of its global strategy, must have access to China.

It was Chinese power in Asia that was seen as

China would "continue to do so
62
as long as she is properly supported by the United States."
able to block Moscow's access.

61
President Nixon said on September 23, 1971 at the Economic Club of Detroit: "Ten or 15 years from now, they(the Chinese) will be a very significant nuclear power." See China and
U.S. Foreign Policy, p. 97.
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In the views of China experts, China's emergence as an additional center of power, particularly a power deviating from
the Soviet-controlled communist group, was corresponding to the
concept of a pluralistic system.

Communist China should be

brought into the new framework of four major powers of the
United States, Japan, the Soviet Union, and China in Asia playing a more active role in shaping the international arrangement
and in reducing the tensions.

Peking's role under this situ-

ation would be a counterpart on the Asian continent to 24tTO in
Europe.
China's nuclear capability with her prospective potential
as one of five economic super powers would be a danger to the
world and unacceptable to the Americans, should she remain isolated from the world.

No country other than the United States

could bring China from isolation into the international comPresident Nixon said that America had " a traditional
63
interest in a peaceful, independent, and self-reliant China."

munity.

During the World War II, one of the reasons for Washington's
support for Nationalist China forces against Japanese aggressions was based on President Franklin Roosevelt's belief that
"U.S. security would be best served by a strong, unified, in64
dependent China."
Secretary of State James F. Byrnes also

631tU.S. Foreign Policy For the 1970's, Shaping a Durable
Peace: A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President
of the United States, May 3, 1973," Department of State Bulletin 68 (Apr.-June 1973): 725. (hereafter referred to as
Shaping Durable Peace").
64william W. Whitson, ed., Foreign Pplicy and U.S. National Security: Maior Postelection Issues, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), p. 139.
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emphasized in 1945 support for "the creation of a strong, unified and democratic China which will contribute to peace and
stability in the Far East and which will enable China effec65
tively to support the United Nations organization."
The Soviet Union's schism with peking had excluded it from
performing this role.

Historical demonstrations had deprived

noscow of the possibility of escalating China's stature.

Tra-

ditionally, the Soviet Union has attempted to create a week
and divided China obsessed with internal problems so that she
would be under Moscow's control.

During the Chinese Civil War

(1944-49), while concluding a treaty of friendship and alliance
with Nationalist China, Moscow also assisted the Chinese Communist party in taking over Manchuria, but dismantled entire
plants there.

When Mao visited Moscow in December 1949, he

was treated on a humiliation posture with the Kremlin forcing
him to recognize

the independence of Outer Mongolia, which

was, in effect, brought into the Soviet sphere.
While asserting that the United States would not play the
game of balance of power in the style of the nineteenth century, Dr. Kissinger tried to eliminate the ideological hostilities between the Americans and the Chinese in the nuclear age
and to establish a dialogue with them.

He stated: "...We and

the Soviet Union, and we and the Chinese, are ideological adversaries, but we are bound together by one basic fact: that
none of us can survive a nuclear war and therefore it is in our

65U.S.-China Chronology, p. 393.
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mutual interest to try to reduce those hostilities that are
bureaucratic vestiges or that are not rooted in overwhelming
66
national concerns."
Under the international environment of multipolarity,
United States-Chinese rapport would not only strengthen American relationships with Western Europe and Japan, but it would
also increase China's ability to resist and to oppose the Soviet Union.

In this regard, the power structure would be ad-

justed to be more compatible with American than with Soviet interests.

American reconciliation with China in Asia could be

expected to have positive effects for the settlement of the
Vietnam War, which had been a pressing issue to the Nixon Administration.

"No framework for peace can be stable if it ex-

cludes significant centers of world power and influence," indicated President Nixon, "This belief is at the heart of our
67
China policy."
The Sino-Soviet Conflict
The Sino-Soviet conflict had offered an opportunity for
the American policy-makers to conduct a momentous

policy

change toward China in terms of the international setting.
Whether their schism was based on ideological dispute, or territorial conflicts, or racial tension, or historical mistrusts,
or competition for leadership in the third world, or just the

66“Dr. Kissinger Interviewed for CBS Television," Department of State Bulletin 68 (Apr.-June 1973): 395.
67#'United States Foreign Policy 1971: A Report of the Secretary of State," Department of State Bulletin 66 (Jan.-June 1972)
: 462. (Hereafter referred to as "1971 U.S. Policy").
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classical source of international tension, or even any other
reasons, their relationship was most likely to be irreconcilable
in the near future in the general views of American China exThis would result in a situation of protracted cold
68
war which would be "neither total war nor total peace." Chiperts.

na and USSR were nuclear powers; both of them should know the
"The Sino-Soviet war, if it comes,
69
It would be
promises to be the world's first nuclear war."
results of an Armageddon.

not only catastrophic to both sides, but also disastrous for
the whole world.

On the other hand, their polemics had gone

so deep that their "rock alliance" in the 1950's seemed to
be irretrievably destroyed.

Anti-Soviet policy was being for-

mulated as Chinese underlying foreign policy envisaged by
"The polemics would have to be carried
70
on," said Mao,"for 10,000 years if necessary."
Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

Until President Nixon's announcement of his visit to Peking in 1971, the Peking-Moscow relationship was remaining at
low tide.

Their state-to-state relations had once been down-

graded in 1967 to the recall of each other's ambassador, but
normal diplomatic ties were resumed in 1970.

Party-to-party

connection also became minimal to the extent that Peking boy-

68U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
United States-China Relations: A Strategy For The Future.
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs
of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. 91st Cong., 2nd sess.,
1970. p. 199. (Hereafter referred to as Future Strategy.)
69Harrison E. Salisbury, War Between Russia
and China,
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1970), p. 135.
70
Snow, "Conversation with Mao, p. 48.
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cotted the twenty-third (March 29-April 8, 1966) and the twenty-fourth (March 30-April 9, 1971) Soviet Communist Party Con71
Trade transactions plummeted from over 2 billion in
gresses.
72
1970.
in
million
46
to
and
1969
in
million
1959 to about 55
Scientific, technical, and cultural exchanges were completely
suspended.
The incident which had immediately the most serious effect on Chinese attitudes toward her "elder brother" was the
Soviet military invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968.
73
While decrying it as "a shameless act," Peking was more sensitive to the enunciation of the "Brezhnev Doctrine," issued as
a justification for the Kremlin's action on the incident.

The

doctrine asserting the Soviet Union's "right" to intervene in
socialist countries for the purpose of protecting the integrity of the communist camp seemed to imply a possible repetition
in China, especially during period of turmoil on the Mainland
such as the "Cultural Revolution."

It could even broaden the

scope to justify the mounting rumor of the Soviet's pre-emptive
attack on China's nuclear capabilities.

The Czechoslovakian

incident strengthened Chinese leaders' views on the Soviet's

71
Chronology of Sino-Soviet Relations 1965-1974,(Hereafter
referred to as Sino-Soviet Chronology), Appendix to U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Oil and Asian Rivals; Sino-Soviet Conflict; Japan and the Oil Crisis. Hearings
before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs. 93rd Cong., 1st & 2nd sess.,
1974. pp. 150 & 182.
72Sino-Soviet ChronologY, pp. 180 & 182.
73
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militancy and might "have provoked them into taking a very hos74
where conflicts occurred the
tile stance on the frontier,"
next year.
Sino-Soviet deterioration was climaxed by military clashes
on the Ussuri River on March 2, 1969; the first military confrontation between the two colossal communist countries.

Ac-

cording to Western analysts, it was Peking that initiated the

armed attack on the Soviet patrols in the Ussuri River to tes75
tify that the Soviet had threatened China's security, and also
to prove their view that the Soviet Union, rather than the
United States, was China's main adversary, in order to support
their desire to begin a rapprochement with the West, especial76
This action showed that the Chinese People's
ly with America.
Liberation Army (PLA), unlike the Czech soldiers, fought against
the Soviet's invasion on their "sacred territory" which had been
ceded to Russia under "unequal treaty" during the Czarist period.

It was "a strategically defensive gesture--namely, a warn-

ing that Peking was not Prague and that, if China was invaded,
77
As to the skirthe PLA would not roll over and play dead."
mishes recurred on Sinkiang border in August 1969; they were
fermented by Moscow attempting to organize anti-Maoist forces

74Future Strategy, p. 30.
75The London-based Institution for Strategic Studies reported that China initiated the first armed conflicts on the
border, while the Soviet Union did the later skirmishes. See
Sino-Soviet Chronology, p. 177.
76
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of minorities within China.

Whatever the impacts of their bor-

der conflicts might be, "the dream of Marxist internationalism
78
lies buried somewhere on the Amur and the Ussuri..."
Hypothetically, the possibility of the Kremlin's decision
to settle the Sino-Soviet conflicts and to subdue Peking's
anti-Soviet emotions with the threats of nuclear weapons could
not be precluded.

Such intentions of USSR, however, had been

inhibited by Washington's discouragement.

In the summer of

1969, immediately after the Sino-Soviet sLccessive mall-scale
conflicts on the border, Moscow had privately requested Washington's position regarding the Soviet's attack on China.

"The

answer, which has never been published, was designed to dis79
The
courage, but how strongly it was worded is not certain."
American restraining position on the Soviet's attack was further reaffirmed by Under S. cretary of State Elliot Richardson's
statement on September 5, 1969 that "we do not seek to exploit
for our own advantage the hostility between the Soviet Union
Ideological differences between the two
80
Communist giants are not our affair." He also said:"President

and Communist China.

Nixon has concluded that our national security would in the
long run be prejudiced by associating ourselves with either
side against the other.

Each is highly sensitive about Ameri-

ca's efforts to improve relations with the other.

We intended,

78Future Strategy, p. 69.
79
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nevertheless, to pursue a long-term course of progressively
81
Richardson's statedeveloping better relations with both'.'
ment reflected neutrality in the Sino-Soviet conflict, indirectly signaling Washington's caution to the USSR in risking action on the Mainland.
As a matter of fact, the notion of a potential Soviet preemptive attack on China's nuclear installations persisted.

An

editorial contained in Pravda in August 1969 warned that "any
war with China would involve nuclear weapons and modern de82
Moscow's nuclear threats seemed to be emphalivery means."
sized by the appointment of Colonal General Vladimir F. Tolubko in August 1969 as the chief of the Soviet Far Eastern
83
Forces, who was one of the Soviet's top missile experts. Another Soviet journalist,Victor Louis, who actually was an
agent of the KGB (Soviet secret police) residing in London as
a correspondent, also reported in mid-September 1969 that
"whether or not the Soviet Union will dare to attack Lop Nor,
China's nuclear center, is a question of strategy, and so the
84
Professor Valadworld would only learn about it afterwards."
mir Petrove, Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, George Washington University, quoted some views of "important individuals"
of USSR on China: "Much as we grieve over what is going on and
much as we are concerned with our security maybe we would even

81Ibid.
82Future Strategy, p. 59.
83
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84
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be forced to one day bomb some Chinese installation or have a
military conflict of a serious dimension, China is on our side.
The future of China and the future of the Soviet Union must be
85
The Chinese slogan of "dig tunone, and one day it will be."
nels deeply, store grain and never seek hegemony" reflected
China's preparation for nuclear attack from her northern neighbor.
In addition to the threats of pre-emptive attack, the Kremlin tried through political and military pressures to exert its
influence on China with the intentions of reviving

Peking's

leaning to its side and inhibiting further rift in the communist camp.

Strategically and militarily, since the border con-

frontations, Soviet military build-up was gradually deployed
along 5,000-mile border of Sino-Soviet and 2,000-mile of China and Outer Mongolia, which was Moscow's faithful satellite
in Asia.

For this purpose, the Trans-Siberia Railroad was

closed for several months for tourists in the summer of 1969.
The Soviet's troops along the Soviet-Chinese border were in86
creased from 13 divisions in 1966 to 35 divisions in 1970.
They were modernized with nuclear weapons and missile units.
The massive Soviet forces created grave concern to Peking's
leaders, who regarded Inner Asia security as the top national
priority, and Manchuria as their industrial heartland.

This

was one of the main reasons that Peking maintained the world's

85Future Stratezv, p. 271.
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largest force of 3 million men, with two-thirds of the divisions deployed in the north and in Manchuria.
Politically and diplomatically, Moscow was conducting a
grand containment of Peking with its allies in Asia and in
Europe.

Ever since the border conflicts, Soviet Secretary

General Lenoid Brezhnev proposed an Asian Collective System
in June 1969 forming a military alliance to contain Peking
and also to undermine the Western influences in Asia.

Premier

Chou En-lai said: "Now Dulles has a successor in our northern
87
neighbour."
In Europe, Moscow was enticing its satellite
countries to isolate Peking.

When members of the Warsaw Pact

were assembled at Budapest in 1969, USSR proposed a resolution
to condemn China as the aggressor in the Ussuri incident and
also request members' sending symbolic troops to the Sino-Soviet border.

Owing to a Rumanian objection, the Soviet ap88
peal was defeated.
However, it again showed that the War-

saw Pact was designed as an instrument of the "Brezhnev Doctrine' in the military dimension.
Furthermore, :,oscow's militant posture to China was serious enough to threaten the legitimacy of Mao's regime.

As

the first-established communist country based on the orthordox
communist ideology and also the leader of the communist countries' camp, the Soviets were on the favourable side in the

87Ross Terrill, "The 800,000,000--Report From China," Atlan
tic Monthly, March 1972, p. 39.
88Future Strategy, pp. 53-54.
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ideological accusations.

At the twenty-fourth Soviet Communist

Party Congress with the attendance of 5,000 party members and
delegations from 101 foreign countries, Soviet Foreign Minister
Andrei Gromyko accused Peking of following "not Marxism-Leninism"--a regime deviating from Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy which
89
The
was the main base of legitimacy for communist leaders.
Soviet press also charged Mao's regime and the cult of Mao,
not the Chinese people, with having diverged from communism,
thereby overthrowing Mao's regime rightfully.
More than that, Moscow always signaled the reconciliation
with Chinese military leaders, who had a long-standing connection with the military establishment of the USSR and who were
opposed to the split with the Kremlin, lest the Soviet's supplement of weapons should be interrupted.

However, such pro-

Soviet military leaders as Marshall Peng Teh-huai and other
eight top military leaders were purged in 1959 on the charge
of conspiring with Moscow.

Liu Shao-chi, the head of state

and "China's Khrushchev," was also demoted during the "Cultural Revolution."

The purge showed anti-Soviet emotions

soaring on the Mainland.
In the general judgement of the American China experts,
the Sino-Soviet antagonism was so deep that the Soviet Union
was seen as Peking's prime adversary, beginning at least in
1965.

Americans and Chinese were traditionally friendly;

their hostilities mainly resulted from the Korean War which
was interpreted as deliberately initiated by Moscow to make

89
Sino-Soviet Chronology, p. 182.
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"Chinese-U.S. relations impossible."
Washington was proceeding to "wind down" the Vietnam War based on the "Nixon Doctrine."
No basic conflicts short of the "Taiwan question" would obstruct their improving relations.

Under the circumstances, it

was opportune for America to make an approach to Peking, particularly when Mao and Chou were still on the scene, because
of their stronger anti-Soviet feelings.

Soviet pressures would

lead to China's response to Washington's overtures.
The Sino-Soviet split changed the power structure in the
Pacific-Asia and also provided the United States greater latitude in dealing with China and the Soviet Union.

Unceasingly

the Soviet Union's military build-up and its global strategy
remained the ominous threat to Washington.

It would be ad-

vantageous for America to avail herself of the split by reconciling with China for the purpose of counterbalancing Soviet
expansion.

China, as an emerging nuclear power with her stra-

tegic location and increasing antagonistic attitude toward the
"Bear" would have a vital role in deterring Soviet activities
in Asia.

Two-front pressures would preclude the Soviets tak-

ing uilitary risks in the Far East and in Europe.
improvements in the Washington-Peking relationship would
let the Soviet Union no longer take American hostility with
China for granted.

United States antagonism with China had
91
been "a luxury for Moscow."
Washington-Peking rapprochement

9
°Salisbury, p. 170.
91James C. Thomson Jr.
"WaLching China-Watchers," Foreizn
eolicv 4 (Fall 1971): 139.
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would be a political leverage regarding the implementation
of detente with USSR: to persuade the Kremlin to take a more
flexible position on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)
or on other pressing issues, such as West European security.
"Kissinger's astonishing visit to China in July (1971)
strengthened the bias of his staff in favour of pressing the
Russians on SLBM's(Submarine-launched ballistic missile).

With

the channel to Peking now wide open, the United States, they
92
Moscow."
bargain
with
to
position
felt, was in a remarkably good
Accommodation with Peking would "keep the Russians honest' during the SALT bargain and hasten Brezhnev's detente diplomacy
93
with the United States.
Detente with China would make a Sino-Soviet
ation more unlikely, too.

reconcili-

More flexible association with non-

comi,unist countries had switched Peking's posture from Moscow,
particularly in trade transactions.

Chinese foreign policy

was always interrelated highly with trade improvement.
more Peking was inclined to the United States

The

the less

A1P with the Soviet Union.
..7ould have to recon,
Washington-Peking detente would be a deterrent to possible
Soviet thought of a pre-emptive attack on Ch.,na, thereby preventing an explusion of a nuclear war.

It was the United

States tnat snould endevor to avoid such a nuclear war in

92John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT, (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), p. 223.
93
Ib1d., pp. 234-235.
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terms of equilibrium and world peace.

President Nixon remark-

ed: "If China and Russia--just running it out hypothetically-get involved in a conflict, it would inevitably involve their
94
here."
neighbours
over
neighbours there, and possibly their
Should Sino-Soviet armed confrontations break out, the most
likely consequences would be a Chinese defeat .

Thus, the

emergence of a weakened China or a pro-Soviet regime as a result of the war would impair the concept of Nixon-Kissinger's
strategy of equilibrium to the stability of the "five powers"
structure.

Operationally, the internal stability and terri-

torial integrity of China was the main factor in stabilizing
the structure of peace in Asia.

In this connection, any in-

dication of Soviet attack on China should be deterred or prevented.
China's approach to the United States would provide a
counterbalance to the Soviet threat or, at least, reduce the
pressures from her.

As far as Peking's leaders were concerned,

detente with Washington was designed to deter Soviet

attack;

it was the United States that would be the only major power
which was able to offset Moscow's posture to the Mainalnd.
Thus, the Sino-Soviet dispute caused Washington and Peking to re-examine their foreign policies.

They shared a com-

mon interest: to ease the tension from their main adversary,
the Soviet Union.

The improved relations evolving between

America and China would benefit each other, constituting a new
constraint to the "Bear" and developing a fresh triangular re-

94“Interview with the President," p. 14.
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lationship of Washington-Tokyo-Peking.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

pointed out that "in the Pacific context, U.S.-Chinese relations vitally involve the new Washington-Tokyo-Peking tri95
angle."
In the development of the triangular relationship between
the United States, USSR, and China, an "even-handed" policy
should be conducted by American decision-makers.

Neither

would the United States manipulate the Sino-Soviet split, nor
would its improving relation with Peking hinder WashingtonMoscow detente.

"We should try to put relations with China

on the same basis as our relations with USSR."
96
Zagoria,
City
University
of
New
S.
York.

said Dr. Donald

The United States should pursue a "policy of meticulous
97
honesty" to develop better relations with both Peking and Moscow.

The Soviet Union should not mistrust Washington-Peking

collusion as being against it, so too should China not be misled by Washington-Moscow cooperation as indicating animosity
against her.

Some international specialists in the USSR had

been concerned about Sino-American detente probably evolving
in a direction against her.
detente

Peking was also concerned about

and sensed the Soviet proposal at the SALT talks in

9
5Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Substance and Style," Newsweek,
August 9, 1971, p. 41.
96
Future Strategy, p. 46.
97u
Partial Transcript of an Interview With Kissinger on
the State of Western World." New York Times, October 13, 1974.
p. 35. (Hereafter referred to as "Kissinger's Interview").
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1970 as implying the possibility of "joint action" by Washing98
ton and Moscow against her.
Secretary Kissinger emphasized:
"Any attempt to play off the Soviet Union and Communist China
against each other would have a high risk that, at least for
99
tactical reasons, they would combine against us."
Brzezinski
also remarked that "the U.S. should maintain better relations
with the other two (China and USSR) than the two maintain with
100
each other."

united States' Dis-entanglinR from Vietnam
American involvement in the Indochina War, a stalemated
and increasingly unpopular war, which the Americans "would not
win and could not end," had been a burning issue to the Nixon
Administration.

Gallup surveys indicated that it was ranked
101
as the most important problem to the public in 1965-69.
One of the main reasons for Mr. Nixon winning the 1968 Presidential campaign was his indication of "secret plan" which was
able to settle peacefully the Vietnam War.

He claimed to know

how to bring the "honorable peace" that might earn the voters'
endorsements.

98U.S., Congress, House, Committee
on Foreign Affairs, Oil
and Asian Rivals: Sino-Soviet Conflict; Japan and the Oil Crisis,
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs
of the Committee on Foreizn Affairs. 93rd Cong., 1st & 2nd sess.,
1974. pp. 150 & 182. (Hereafter referred to as Asian Rivals).
99,
"Kissinger's Interview," p. 35.
100
Brzezinski, "Substance and Style," p. 41.
101
Irish and Frank, p. 107.
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The Johnson Administration's policy toward Vietnam, particularly the escalation of the war in 1965, had been appreciably criticized, accounting for his credibility gap at home
and abroad.
tic politics

It had led to the great debates in American domesand prompted the anti-war demonstrations all

over the American continent.

It had caused anti-American de-

monstrations in Europe and Asia.

It had affected .',merican re-

sources, men, uoney, and weakened the American prestige in the
It had been rated as the lowest point of public ap102
Also it created one of the
proval of his Administration.

world.

main reasons for his announcement not to stand for re-election.
"The war has imposed severe strains on the United States, not
only militarily and economically but socially and politically
as well." said Mr. Nixon, "Bitter dissension has torn the fabric of American intellectual life, and whatever the outcome of the
103
By late 1967, most
war the tear may be a long time mending."
American people had preferred to end the war honorably on terms
that the ending would not only save face but also hold up South
104
the
of
warfare.
Vietnam in the aftermath
From the viewpoints of American China experts, the United
States involvement in the Vietnam War, especially since the

1021b,,.
lu , p. 104. Gallup Poll showed that the percentage
of people who rated favorably the Johnson Administration's job
performance in 1968 was 35%, which was the lowest point in his
Administration.
10
3Nixon, "Asia After Vietnam," pp. 113-114.
104Thomas A. Bzailey, A Diplomatic History of the American
People, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974), p. 912.
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1965 escalation, increased the hostility and tension between
the United States and China since the Korean War.

Being an

instrument of containment policy toward the Mainland China,
the American role in such conflicts had resulted in the Chinese condemnation of the United States as "imperialist ag105
gressors."
Peking had regarded North Vietnam, like North Korea, as
a buffer state, a very sensitive area to China's national security.

The Vietnam War, for the Chinese leaders, was a test

of Mao's theory of "wars of national liberation" which could
not be defeated; or else Mao's prestige as a world revolutionary leader and theorist would be weakened.

Therefore, they

had by every means supported North Vietnam and the Viet Cong
to engage in such a long-range warfare.

North Vietnamese had

been convinced by Peking to continue the fighting until the
Americans were weary of the confrontation and finally withdrew from it.

In addition to the Soviet Union, China was a

main sponsor of Hanoi with the supplement of communication,
training, technicians, and logistics, exclusive of troop
volvements.

in-

Even during the escalation of war in the Johnson

Administration, a constant communication by rail between Hanoi and Southern China remained running--one of the main reasons that the United States massive bombardment could not inhibit the North Vietnam fighting capability.

Strategically,

Mainland China was a "reliable rear area" for them.

1°5 Fairbank, "China-American Connection," p. 43.
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The unique relationship between North Vietnam and China
caused the American China experts and decision-makers as well
to recognize that an escalation of the large-scale warfare
in Vietnam might compel Peking to intervene in the conflict,
106
as the Chinese forces had intervened in the Korean War. In
such case, the escalation of the conflict to a nuclear war
had to be considered as possible.

Under the circumstances,

the Soviet Union might take the opportunity of United StatesChinese conflict to expand its influences in Berlin, West L.,urope, Western Hemisphere and elsewhere.

Thus, American inter-

vention in the Vietnam War should be restrained lest a direct
confrontation between the United States and China should take
place.

That was the reason that the American government had

stressed to Peking during the Warsaw talks that the United
States intended neither to destroy North Vietnam and seize its
territory, nor to threaten Chinese security and to invade the
107
Mainland.
Under these circumstances, as long as the warfare in Vietnam went on, United States-Chinese relationships would be more
and more in tension.

Mistrust and suspicion would dominate

the relations between the two countries.

Peking would fear

the war's escalation threatening its security.

China's se-

curity was interrelated with the Vietnam problem; therefore,
106
Irlye, p. 107.
107
Kenneth T. Young, "American Dealings with Peking,"
Foreign Affairs 45 (1966-67): 83.

50
the implications of peacefully settling it, together with
troops-withdrawing gracefully, should be involved in the
United States posture to Peking.

Dr. Zagoria indicated that

"there is some possibility for avoiding future Vietnams, and
fo. avoiding the terrible possibility of a U.S. war with China, only if we begin now to take advantage of the present trend
of international relations, and develop a more amicable re108
lation with China."
Only United States troops withdrawal
from Indochina would soften Chinese suspicion, thereby creating a positive effect on Peking's attitude toward America.
Besides, the withdrawal would correspond to domestic urging.
The pressing issue for the Nixon Administration during
his first term was to settle the Vietnam conflict and to withdraw the United States troops out of harm's way but also
without betraying the commitment to South Vietnam for the purpose of attaining "honorable peace" and maintaining American
credibility.

President Nixon's "secret plan" for the settle-

ment of the conflict was being perceived as "Vietnamization"-vietnamizing the Vietnam War--by which the United States would
give to South Vietnamese troops the exclusive charge of defensive responsibilities, with essential financial and hardware
supplements from America. The American troops would be evacuated
gradually.

Secretary Rogers stated that "high priority is

being given to preparing South Vietnamese forces to assume a
109
growing share of the combat burden."

108
Future Strategy, p. 80.
109
Ibid., p. 347.
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In order to conduct this Vietnamization, President Nixon
declared the "Guam Doctrine" later officially called the "Nixon Doctrine" on the eve of his July 1969 tour of Asia and Europe, outlining the basic principles of future American policy
in Asia.

While stressing that the troops of the nations which

had been threatened should from now on take the prime responsibility for the defensive duties, he declared that in the future, American troops would not be committed to international
110
conflicts in Asia.
American determination to "wind down" the Vietnam War
depended on the successful Vietnamization, which could be effectively implemented by strengthening the Vietnamese defensive capability through United States modernization of their
troops, and also by weakening the North Vietnamese offensive
capability through the declination of outside assistance to
them in the course of Vietnamization.

In this regard, the

position of China's support for North Vietnam was compelling.
Should Chinese influences over North Vietnam change direction,
the level of North Vietnamese and Viet Gong activities would
decline.
There were three ways in the field of decreasing North
Vietnamese offensive capabilities by cutting off their supplies from the outside.

The United States could mine Haiphong

harbour preventing Russian supplements via the sea, or cut off
the rail line connecting North Vietnam and the Mainland, or
persuade Peking to decrease supplies to North Vietnam.

110New York Times, July 26, 1969.

Among
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these alternatives, persuasion was the best one.

Since the

cut-off of the rail communication would risk a conflict with
the Mainland.

The soaring anti-war tides contributed to the

American policy-makers adopting the latter to make a new approach to China.

It was hoped that through improved United

States-Chinese relations, the supplies from the ILainland to
North Vietnam would be reduced, or the Soviet assistance to
Hanoi in transit to the Mainland would be discouraged.
Beyond that, China would be expected, as far as the American policy-makers were concerned, to employ a role of good
offices to prevent a large-scale attack on the withdrawing
American forces, thus facilitating the withdrawal of troops
111
safely and completely;
and to speed up the release of
112
American prisoners of war,
attaining the goal of Vietnamization by the peaceful disengagement from the Vietnam confrontation.

Nonetheless, the extent to which the Chinese

leaders could influence North Vietnam was impossible to predict.

Secretary Rogers stated that "we think that China, of

course, is the key--Communist China, is the key to the future
of Indochina.

If they (Communist Chinese) would talk sensi-

bly about a settlement, we think we could work out a peaceful
113
settlement very quickly."

111Ralph N. Clough, "Musing on Nixon's Peking Visit,"
Foreign Policy 4 (Fall 1971): 132.
112"1,dixon in China: Who Stands to Gain Most," U.S. News
& World Report, February 28, 1972, p. 14.
113"Secretary Rogers Visits the Philippines, South Vietnam,
Japan, and the United Kingdom," Department of State Bulletin,
63 (July-Dec. 1970): 145.
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Communist China's views on

a

Vietnam War were indeed encouraging.

peaceful settlement of

ie

In 1965, Iiao had in-

dicated the possibility of reconvening an international conference enforcing the 1954 Geneva Accords, prior to United
114
States forces withdrawing from Vietnam.
Subsequent to President

Nixon's -1nnouncement of his invitation to visit China

in 1971, Chou stated to Mr. Gough Whitlam, the leader of Australia's Labour Party on his Mainland visit, that China was
115
willing to take part in a Geneva Conference in Indochina.
In the views of China experts, Peking's favorable reaction was
understandable.

The escalation of the war had increased not

only the risks but also the burdens to the Chinese.

The Sino-

Soviet split had upgraded Chinese tensions with the Russians
on the northern frontier.

Therefore, the strained climate on

the southern borders would be better eliminated, lest the twofront threats should risk their national security.

Since 1965,

Iioscow has been sensed as the main adversary by Peking; more
ominous threats from the Kremlin to the Mainland were surfacing from the 1965 escalation of the war in Vietnam.

On the

other hand, the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam War under
the form of the Geneva conference would promote Chinese prestige, acquiring the international recognition of their "cer116
Lain legitimate interests in Southeast Asia."

114Edgar Snow, "China Observed: Edgar Snow Reporting," The
New republic, February 26, 1972, p. 11.
115"Nixon: I Will Go To China," Newsweek, July 26, 1971,
p. 21.
116Future
Strategy, P. 80.
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In regard to the settlement of the Vietnam War, the Nixon
Administration might be more eager than the Chinese leaders.
As the 1972 Presidential campaign loomed large, President Nixon had regarded the settlement of the confrontation in Indochina as his priority at the end of his first term.

President

Nixon's strategists for re-election believed that to make a
reconciliation with China would be an unexpected vantage point
for Nixon's chance for election.

His enunciation of a planned

visit to the Nainland prior to election would create an image
of himself as a world statesman and peacemaker.

Nis prestige

and image among the American public should rise in the months
ahead up to re-election day.

The reports and analyses of the

upcoming visit would headline the mass media.
The timing of President Nixon's visit in early 1972 reflected his intention to keep his 1968 campaign promise, winning more votes.

ale Mainland visit showed President Nixon

endeavoring to bring "honorable peace" to Vietnam, foretelling
a probability of China's influences to end the war in Indochina, and of speeding the release of the Americans imprisoned
by the North Vietnam.

Marathon talks on Vietnam had lowered
117
his popularity among the public.
Prospective peaceful settlement of the conflict would enhance his rating.

Even do-

vish politicans such as George McGovern, Birch Bayh, and the

117Gallup found when President Nixon announced the "Nixon
Doctrine': his rating percentage in the public was 68%, highest in his Administration. Between 1970 and 1972, his rating sank to about 50%. When the Vietnam War was settled in
1973, his rating rose to 68%. See Irish and Frank, p. 104.
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Republican Party's maverick Paul N. (Pete) McCloskey proclaimed his China Lrip well to settle the Vietnam War.
President Nixon's tour to China had been seen constituting a setback to the Democratic Party in the 1972 campaign.
Those Democratic politicans who had planned to visit the Mainland would have to suspend the tour.

Chinese leaders would

be prudent enough to refrain their visits from preceding
118
With a visit to China appearing to
's
trip.
the President
be the right thing for a Democratic candidate during the campaign, the President's trip to Peking would "steal the spot119
A striking diplomatic
."
primaries
c
Democrati
light from the
coup to China would subjugate the President's opponents' challenging for pressing issues such as a Viet Nam settlement,
thus placing the Democratic Party on the defensive.

"James

Reston, who visited China himself, said Nixon was going because he wanted to be re-elected, and that view has much mer120
it."
Evidently political values were endowed with the President's upcoming visit.
United States-Chinese intentions for the settlement of
the Vietnam conflict led to their reconciliation.

Therefore,

President Nixon stated in his announcement of the visit to

118For example, Senator Edward M. Kennedy had applied
for a visa to the Mainland. See "A Setback for the Democrats,"
Newsweek, July 26, 1971, p. 21.
119Ibid.
120John Chancellor, "Who Produced The China Show?" Foreizn Policy 7 (Summer 1972): 89.
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Peking that the trip was intended to "exchange views on ques121
tions of concern to the two sides."
Changing Chinese Image in
Congress and the Public
Reflecting at least its negative powers over foreign policy, Congress was also re-evaluating United States policy
toward Communist China during the 1960's and early 1970's.
In addition to the hearings held by the committees concerned
for the purpose of seeking the China experts' views on the
China problem and for educating the public, Congress had also
expressed its views regarding the improvement of relations
with Peking, strengthening the Executive's posture toward
Mainland China.
There had been some congressional acts which affected
the Administration's approaches to Peking.

First of all, the

Senate passed on September 25, 1969 the recognition resolution declaring that United States recognition of foreign government and exchange of diplomatic representatives with it
did not "of itself imply that the United States approves of
122
The reform, ideology, or policy of that government."
solution would not only clarify the American policy of recognition, but also establish closer communication between
the Americans and foreign people as well.

While expressing

121 .
"Nixon's Announcement to visit China," p. 121.
122Congressional Quarterly Inc., Congressional Almanac,
vol. XXV: Almanac 91st Congress 1st Session...4969 (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1970), p. 234.
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the position of the Department of State, George H. Aldrich,
acting legal adviser of the Department, stated that the Depart123
ment supported such a proposed resolution.
According to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's
views, the United States Administration's conduct of recognition policy was not a legal but a political act, which, therefore, should be based on national interests, not on the political system or ideologies cherished by the government to which
the Administration would like to extend its recognition.

The

resolution had separated the question of recognition from that
of approval or disapproval of different political events, providing more latitude and more flexibility for the Administration to consider its recognition policy.
Introducing the resolution, Senator Alan Cranston (D Calif.) stressed that the United States non-recognition policy
toward communist countries such as the Soviet Union previously and Communist China presently with the intentions to influ124
ence their political events had been regarded as a failure.
They were not isolated by the American non-recognition policy;
rather America was isolated.

"Non-recognition leads to a lack

of communication with the very people," said Senator Cranston,
"it is most important for us to talk to--those who would be
125
our enemies."

12
3Ibid.
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125
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Although the Senate Foreign Relations Committee emphasized that the resolution of recognition of governments was not
1.26
intended to bring about the recognition of Communist China,
it had, in effect, paved the way for the Administration to
take more flexible postures toward Peking.

It seemed to im-

ply that the Senate, having a predominant role in sharing foreign policy, had shifted its posture toward Mainland China and
other communist countries such as North Korea, North Vietnam,
which Washington had not recognized.

Senator Thomas J. Dodd

(D. Conn.) who had opposed the resolution stated that "if the
resolution is not intended to clear the way for the recognition
of Communist China...then it is difficult to understand the mo127
tivation behind it...."
This sense of the Senate, even though not binding, would
play a crucial role in the Administration's decision to recognize the Peking regime in the future.
Second, and also the most impressive action of Congress
regarding Communist China was the end of opposition to her admission to the United Nation (U.N.) in 1971.

Since 1950, the

House of Representatives had annually expressed its opposition
to Communist China's membership in the U.N. with the attachment of its resolution to the appropriation bills under a rule
128
waving points of order.
Reiteratively the sense of Congress
indicated that Communist China was unwilling to fulfill the ob-

1261bid.
127
Ibid., p. 235.
128
China and U.S. Foreign Policy, p. 53.
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ligations

of the U.H. and should, therefore, not be admitted

Every year the Presi129
dents signed the appropriation bills into law.
to it as the representative of China.

The tide was turned on June 24, 1971 when the House reviewed the State, Justice, and Commerce appropriations bill
for fiscal 1972 (H. 9272-P1 92-77).

The resolution of op-

position to Peking's membership as the representative of Chi130
Rep. Sidney R.
na at the U.L. was deleted from the bill.
Yates (D Ill) made a point of order against the long-standing

131
China resolution "as being legislation on an appropriation bill."
His point of order was accepted by Rep. Rooney, the floor manager of the bill.

With that, two decades of opposition to China's

seat at the U.L. eroded.

The deletion removed Congressional

restrictions on the Administration's efforts to resolve the problem of China's U.. membership.
In the general American China experts' views, Peking should
be represented as China at the U.N.

Dr. Whiting stated: "more

than 100 China scholars in more than 50 ...merican colleges and
132
They considered that the
universities support this position.
Peking regime had uninterruptedly and exclusively ruled the

129Ibid.
13°Ibid.
131
Ibid.
132U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations.
Lnited States Relations with the People's Republic of China.
iiearinzs before the Committee on Foreign Relations. 92nd Cong.,
1st sess., 1971, p. 191. (Hereafter referred to as U.S. Relations with China.)
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Mainland over twenty years.

Therefore it should be regarded

as the sole representative of China and granted its legitimate
seat.

"The question for the United Nations is simply who re-

presents China," stated Dr. Whiting,who was reflecting general
133
They opPeking."
clearly
is
experts' views. "The answer
posed the formula of "dual representation," since both Communist China and Nationalist China had objected to this proposal
to settle their representation.
the concept of "one China

Both "Chinas" had insisted on

of which Taiwan is a part; therefore

a two-China formula would be unrealistic and unworkable.
However, some experts such as Barnett and Zagoria were
supporting the "dual representation" formula to settle China
representation--Communist China and Nationalist China were
seated at the U.N., representating their people and the territory under control respectively.

This formula was based on

the principle of universality in which all the nations should
be represented at the world organization, and on precedents:
one was the triple representation of the Soviet Union, together with two of its member republics, the Ukraine and Byelorussia in the General Assembly; another was the United Arab
republic when it was composed of Syria and Egypt as one nation;
their components' seat at thu U.N. remained unchanged.
Whatever the formula might be taken by the United States
government, Peking's seat at the U.N. was strongly supported
by experts.

It was expected that Peking's admission to the

would over years accommodate itself with other members

133Ibid., p. 203.

f)I

and operate its role effectively, just as
did.

Soviet Union

China would adjust to the realities of the world organi-

zation; her rigid and dogmatic postures would be remolded lest
she should alienaLe herself from the third world countries.
Peking's resumption of its normal diplomatic relations with
nations after the "Cultural Revolution" had created international trends favorable to its membership.

China would even-

tually be admitted to the U. N., even without American approval.

Thus, continuance of opposition to China's seat would

only result in deepening the hostilities between America and
China.
In a nutshell, China experts' views were that "in the interests of bringing Peking into the U.N., we should accept Tai134
wan's ouster."
Nationalist China's membership at this organization was not essential to Taiwan's survival; should it
be expelled from U.N. when Communist China entered, Taiwan
could still exist out of the U.N., just as was the case for
South Korea, West Germany, which were not members of the U.N.
The United States would still retain its diplomatic ties with
and adhere to its military commitments to Taiwan.
As far as United States decision-makers were concerned,
the Chinese leaders for the first time since the "Cultural
Revolution" showed interest in the U.N.'s membership.

Their

preconditions for admission stated in 1965 such as the ouster

134Dr. Zagoria testified in Congressional hearings in
1970 that the majority view of a conference of both governmental and academic specialists on China's representation held
in 1970 was to support Peking's seat. See Future Strategy,
p. 73.
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of Nationalist China, cancellation of the 1951 resolution condemning Communist China as an aggressor, and revision of the
U.N. Charter were in 1970 reduced to the demand for expelling
135
The importance of Peking's seat in the
Nationalist China.
world organization could not be disregarded

because there

were some urgent problems which could not be handled without
China's participation and cooperation.
While acknowledging the fact that Peking had "effective
control over the Mainland," the American government stressed
the view that Nationalist China with its 16 million people
had the right "to be represented and recognized in the inter136
Furthermore, because Nationalist Chinational community."
na had showed its good record at the U.N., the United States
was inclined to maintain Nationalist China's membership.

Each

political entity controlling its territory should be represented at the world organization.

The American governmen - ac-

cepted acompromise position; Secretary Rogers declared on August 2, 1971 that the United States abandoned its former opposition to Communist China's membership but continued to re137
However, the
seat.
China's
Nationalist
expel
to
sist any move
American formula for China's representation in the end was unsuccessful.

135
Future Strategy, PP• 301-303.
136Ibid., Assistant Secretary Marshall Green testified
in Congressional hearings.
137China and U.S. Foreign Policy, p. 23.
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Finally, the Senate passed a resolution by voice vote on
August 1, 1971 (S Con Res 38) praising President Nixon for accepting the invitation to undertake "a journey for peace" and
endorsing his efforts to establish normal relations with Pe138
king.
The Senate's position further promoted the Administration's initiatives to make the diplomatic opening to China.
An initiation of a new China policy was also affected by
the policy-makers' consideration of the attitude of the public.
It could not be formulated without a mandate from the American
people, the original and ultimate source of power.

The polls

which are generally used to show the public's attitude toward
policies found that the American public mood on Communist China was changing.

When the People's Republic of China was es-

tablished in 1949, most respondents were opposed to recogni139
Pretion of it, or to trade transactions with the Chinese.
sumably it was because the regime was founded by violent forces
and intimately allied with the Soviet Union.

The communist

ideology was irreconcile to the Americans; Peking's mistreatment of Americans and confiscation of American property were
unacceptable.
However, the American public since the 1960's had begun
to fundamentably change

its

attitudes toward the Chinese,

138Congressional Quarterly Inc., Congressional Almanac,
vol. XXVII: Almanac 92nd Congress 1st Session..i.1971 (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1972), p. 363.
139
Gallup found in 1949 that 41% of the respondents opposed, 197, favored; and 15% expressed no opinion, to the recognition of China. Regarding trade with the Mainland, 34%
of the respondents favored continuation, 46% discontinuation,
and 20% had no opinion.
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signifying an improvement of the relationship with them; exchanges of friendlier feelings were on increased willingness
140
to furnish foods and engage in other trade.
Public support
for China's membership at the U.N. rose from nearly 11 per
cent in 1950 to approximately 21 per cent in 1961, 35 per cent
141
in 1969, and about 45 per cent in 1971.
The mass media also
commended President Nixon's new posture toward Mainland China.
Time magazine reported the public "highly favorable" to his
142
trip to Peking.
Meanwhile the favorable attitude toward Nationalist China
during the 1950's was receding in the 1960's.

Senator Joseph

McCarthy of Wisconsin back in 1950 had charged the Department
of State with hiring "205 known communists." Thus, he frustrated the policy-makers' attempt to pursue new approaches to
Peking.

Some allegedly pro-communist China professional bu-

reaucrats were forced to leave.

The legacy of McCarthy was

eroded in 1954 when the Senate formally condemned his charges
as groundless.

Also such determined anti-communists as Sec-

retary of State John Foster Dulles (1953-59), who had espoused
the containment of Communist China at the Eisenhower Adminis-

140Gallup reported on
March 19, 1961 that 53% of the respondents favored, 32% opposed, and 15% expressed no opinion
on the matter of improving relations with Communist China.
Regarding sending food to the Mainland, 53% were in favor,
32% were opposed, and 11% had no opinion. On doing business
with Mainland China, 47% were in favor, 35% were opposed, and
18% expressed no opinion.
141
Irish and Frank, p. 114.
142"Nixon's Coup: To Peking for Peace," Time. July 26,
1971, p. 16.
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tration, were no more on the scene.
munist China policy slowly lapsed.

Since then, an anti-ComThe old so-called "China

lobby" which had persistently supported Nationalist China
was either retired from Congress or passed away.

A new Chi-

na lobby, which was composed of relatively flexible Democrats and moderate Republicans urging a new China policy ,was
emerging.

CHAPTER II
THE BREAKTHROUGH
Tracing the American intentions to reconcile with Mainland
China, it was found that they had originated as far back as the
Kennedy Administration.

President Kennedy regarded China as a

problem that should be re-examined during his second term: "China is a problem for the second term.

We can't deal with it be-

cause there is too much feeling in the country that we can't,
143
for political reasons, make a move in China."
A special
group was also formed in 1963 framing some proposals such as
opening up trade and travel to Peking.

However, President Ken-

nedy's tragic death brought the end to those new overtures to
China.
President Johnson had expressed his desire for "reconciliation" with Communist China, but his preoccupation with the
situation in Vietnam had absorbed his energy and time that
might otherwise have been used to improve relations with Peking.

Only when President Nixon entered the White House did

the American policy of rapprochement with China materialize.
President Nixon's new overture to China seemed to follow
his article entitled "Asia After Viet Nam" contained in For-

143
Future Strategy, p. 86.
66

67
eizn Affairs of October 1967.

"Any American policy toward

Asia," he wrote, "must come urgently to grip with the reali144
During his 1968 President campaign, he
ty of China."
evolved a new China policy and stated that the beginning of
the dialogue with Mainland China should come "during the two
145
The future President even exPresident."
the
next
of
terms
pressed at the Republican National Convention in Miami in August 1968 his desire to yisiL Peking if he were granted a
146
visa.
When the Presidential election was settled in November
1968, Peking began to signal its new posture to Presidentelect Nixon.

As far as the Chinese leaders were concerned,

Mr. Nixon was a suitable actor in the conduct of improving
Chinese-American relationships.

It had been so encouraging

that he had showed his new overtures in writing and statements.

His image of hostility toward the USSR was congruent

with Mao's anti-Soviet policy.
The Soviets' gradual military build-up along the border
from 1966 and their military invasion of Czechoslovakia in
1968, justified with the "Brezhnev Doctrine," led Peking's
leaders to signal a new posture to Washington, refraining
from the possible threats of two fronts and from SovietAmerican collusion against them.

In contrast to its pre-

144
Nixon, "Asia After Viet Nam," p. 121.
.
14
5China and U.S. Foreign Policy, p. 89.
146
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vious attacks oa the Soviet policy of "peaceful co-existence"
with America, Peking proposed on November 26, 1968, to resume
the Warsaw talks on February 20, 1969, discussing "an agreement on five principles of peaceful co-existence" with the
147
Peking's proposal was linked with the deUnited States.
mand for withdrawal of American troops and military installations from Taiwan.

Robert D. Murphy, President-elect Nixon's

liaison officer, stated in November 1968, that Mr. Nixon favor148
ed the proposed meeting.
Peking's "five principles of peaceful co-existence"--respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs,
equality amd mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence--were
originated by Chou En-lai at the 1955 Bundung Conference in
Indonesia, in which he publicly offered to negotiate with America on the "Taiwan question."

The unyielding

stance of Sec-

retary Dulles denounced these principles as a "farce."
As the thirty-seventh President, Nixon intended to make
fundamental changes in the China policy.

A new China policy

became part of the mainstream of United States foreign policy
for the 1970's.

"When I took office," said President Nixon,

"I was determined to re-establish contact between the most
149
populous and most powerful countries in the world."

147
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Mutual Siznals for Rapprochement
Commiting himself to negotiation, rather than confrontation, as his guide to the policy-formulating toward China, President Nixon undertook a new China policy as one of his pri150
orities "during the first weeks of his Administration.
Through public and private channels, he signalled more flexible postures toward China.
First of all, the American Administration renounced the
isolation policy toward Communist China, diminishing Chinese
hostilities.

President Nixon declared that "whoever was the

President of the United States had to develop a policy which
would bring the isolation of a billion Chinese from the rest
151
On July 25, 1969 at an informal
of the world to an end."
news conference in Guam, he announced the "Guam Doctrine,"
officially called the "Nixon Doctrine," spelling out the basic
principles of future American policy in Asia.

The President

stressed that while adhering to American commitments, the
Asian nations themselves should shoulder the main burden of
their defense; the United States troops would not fight the
battle for them, but only help them fight against internal
subversion.
The "Nixon Doctrine" indicated that the reduced American military presence in the Asian region was recognizing
that the Communist Chinese threat--the threat of Chinese mi-

150Ibid.
11"President Nixon Interviews at Newspaper Editors Meeting," Department of State Bulletin 64 (Jan.-June 1971): 566.
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litary aggression in this area--was perceived much smaller than
before, and also to greatly revise Secretary Dulles' containment policy of Peking.

The reduction If American forces in

Asia was intended to demonstrate friendly American feelings
toward China and the preference for China's emergence from isolation.
The impacts of the "Nixon Doctrine" on the strategic thinking of Peking's leaders were as much as those of the "Brezhnev
Doctrine."

The former reflected less threats of "American im-

perialism" to China; the latter, the mounting threats of "Soviet revisionists."
Furthermore, America reduced its military posture toward
China with the suspension in December 1969 of the Seventh
Fleet patrol in the Taiwan Strait.

The patrol had, for nearly

two decades since the Korean War, been seen as a long-term
block against China's expansion to the Pacific Ocean and as an
instrument of containment of China from Taiwan.

The suspen-

sion, according to the Department of State, would "in no way
152
affect the U.S. defense contribution" to Taiwan.
Besides,
all nuclear weapons stationed in Okinawa, which had been deemed a deterrLnt against Peking, were moved in late 1971 to bases
more remote frcm the Mainland, rather than to Taiwan, as was
153
proposed by the Pentagon planners.
These arrangements represented the departure from the policy that had sought the encirclement of the Mainland from Taiwan and from Vietnam.

152
U.S.-China Chronology, p. 412.
153China and U.S. Foreign Policy, p. 22.
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Second, some concrete moves, voluntary and unilateral,
were being pursued by the American government to signify its
determination to a dialogue with Peking.

The preliminarily

amicable gesture was shown in the commercial and travel fields.
The restriction on American citizens' purchasing China-produced goods was modified on July 21, 1969 to restrict only
those goods valued at not more than $100. This ceiling was
154
^.1,aerican subsidiaries
further lifted on December 15, 1969.
in the third countries were allowed to trade with the Mainland,
except for goods of strategic nature.

Scholars, journalists,

students, and congressmen were permitted to travel on the Main155
land "with a legitimate purpose."
President Nixon's decision to take a diplomatic coup regarding Peking was further conveyed through "mutually friendly
countries" of China and the United States.

French President

Charles de Gaulle was the first leader of the third country
told by President Nixon on his March 1969 visit to Paris, about
his intention to normalize with Peking.

"It was the General

de Gaulle, I was authoritatively informed," said Edgar Snow,
"that Mr. Nixon had first confided his intentions to seek a
156
Chinese leaders were informed
China."
with
detente
genuine
by the French government that Washington was going to withdraw from Vietnam and to normalize relations step by step with

154Ibid.
155 Ibid.
156Snow, "Conversation With Mao," p. 47.
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Peking.

"Peking was impressed with the first point, and as

events unrolled and U.S. troops came back from Saigon,began
157
to realize that :dxon had meant what he told De Gaulle."
Just as President Nixon admired de Gaulle

so too did Mao,

who had been an eager student of features of French history
such as Napoleon's career and the Paris Commune.

In world

politics, Mao and de Gaulle shared the same views of "independence" and "national sovereignty," opposing Moscow-Washington's formula o: dominating international affairs.

Since

the establishment of diplomatic relations between Paris and
Peking in 1964, Paris had been the main diplomatic contact
for China in seeking to improve relations with other countries.

Thus, the first signal of President Nixon's accommo-

dation with Peking through the French-Chinese special connection made Washington's move less difficult.
Another actor playing a go-between role in the opening
of the communication between the United States and China was
ixumanian President Nicolae Ceaucescu.

His refusal to take a

pro-Soviet position in the Soviet-Chinese disputes over the
border conflicts in the 1969 Warsaw Pact meeting and his personal relationship with the Chinese leaders, had been proven
Lo be well-suited to an intermediary.

When President Nixon

paid a visit to -umania in August 1969, the first American
President's trip to a communist country, new American approaches to Peking were related.

As a gesture of Washing-

157Terrill, 'China and World," p. 43.
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ton's gratitude to Rumanian assistance, Bucharest was granted
in December 1971 Export-Import Bank credits with "most-favor158
ed-nation" status.
In addition, during President Nixon's visit to Yugoslavia
in 1971, Washington's rapprochement with Peking was also discussed.

Also there were at least some undefined high-ranking

diplomats performing message-delivery between Washington and
159
Peking.
America's preliminary steps toward reconciliation with
China received no immediate response from Peking.
surprising to Washington's decision-makers.

It was not

Assistant Sec-

retary Marshall Green stated: "One Peking source has remarked when the time comes to improve relations with the United
States, this will come all at once since improving relations
piecemeal would have a harmful effect on the Chinese people's
revolutionary fervor.

In other words, we face the realiza-

tion that any improvements in our relations may have to wait
a time until Peking sees greater value in reconciliation with
the United States than it now derives from our 'devil's
160
role'."
The value to Peking of reconciliation with Washington
was not perceived until the end of 1969, after a series of
border conflicts with Moscow and the rumor of the Soviet's

158u

On to China," Newsweek

December 13, 1971, p. 22.

159Snow,"Conversation With Mao," p. 47.
160
Future Strategy, p.287.
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pre-emptive attack on the Mainland.
Praising the Administration's measures toward the Mainland, China specialists believed that the United States' unilateral actions would create a bargaining situation and would
have some influences on China.

No negative response such as

the denunciation of the 1966 Johnson Administration's initiative was received.

An indirect signal was received that the

Chinese had great interest in purchasing General Motors trucks
161
made in Italy.
The new American posture had salutary effects on American policy towad China.

They had removed the

major domestic obstacle to the new China policy, eliminating
the fear of domestic repercussions from China policy innovation, inherited from the great debates such as the one over
162
"who lost China" in the Truman Administration.
Professor
James C. Thomson, Jr., of Harvard University, stated: "fhere
is clearly today a broad public base of support for a more
realistic approach to China--thanks in part to the efforts
163
of the Nixon Administ_ration':
Since then, the China policy
was no longer a domestic or partisan issue, either between
the President and Congress, or between the Democratic and Republican parties.
In order to elicit further response from Peking, China

1611n July 1970, the United States approved the Roberto
Perlini Company selling Communist China 80 large dump trucks
with General Motors engines. See Future Strategy, p. 354.
162U.S. Relations with China, p. 179.
163Ibid.
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experts suggested that the Administration promote unofficial
contacts and lift trade restrictions.

Washington's position

on China's admission to the U.N. and non-recognition policy toward China should also be re-examined for the attainment of normalization.

Dr. Whiting indicated: "If President

Nixon and Secretary Rogers are willing to undertake this large
venture, I am sure they will enjoy the full support of the
164
Congress and the American people':
The proposed Warsaw talk of February 20, 1969,initiated
by Peking with the new Administration was suspended by China,
which lodged a protest against Washington's granting of political aslyum in the Hague to a high-ranking defected diplomat
of China.

However, the Sino-Soviet military border clashes

in March and August 1969

contributed to Peking's receptive

attitude toward resumption of the talks.

The first meeting

was held on January 20, 1970; the second, on February 20,
165
Peking also unex1970.
20,
May
on
1970; and the third,
pectedly rel2ased American Bishop James B. Walsh in July 1970,
166
Washingn.
Washingto
with
ation
as its signal of reconcili
ton and Peking agreed to hold the talks in the respective embassies alternatively, rather than at Poland's Mysliwiecki
Palace which had been previously arranged by Polish authori-

I64Ib1d., p. 194.
165The talk of May 1970 was postponed by Peking because
of the American action in Cambodia in the spring of 1970.
166"Bishop Walsh Released by Chinese Communists," Department of State Bulletin 63 (July-Dec. 1970): 114.
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ties, anticipating their serious character and also removing
them from monitoring by Warsaw.
Furthermore, Peking took people-to-people diplomacy to
America.

On October 1, 1970,at the Chinese National Day pa-

rade, Mao appeared side-by-side with Ed8ar Snow, his "American friend," indicating that the Chinese-American people-topeople relationship was improving.

The Chinese leaders' new

postures toward Washington were conveyed to Snow.

Mao him-

self even expressed his desire to meet with the American leader.

"He (Nixon) should be welcomed because, Mao explained,

at present the problems between China and the U.S.A. would
have to be solved with Nixon," wrote Snow.

"Mao would be

happy to talk with him, either as a tourist or as a Presi167
From Snow's point of view, the Chinese leaders
dent."
were "eager for fresh news of the United States"; they were
willing for peaceful co-existence with the Americans on the
168
basis of tcic, five principles.
Encouraged by the Chinese response and acknowledging the
characteristic sensitivity of the Chinese, Nixon became the
first President to officially and deliberately use

Commun-

ist China's formal name--People's Republic of China (PRC)-at a toast on October 26, 1970, to Rumanian President Ceau169
It was an implicit recognition of the facts of life
cescu.

167Snow, "Conversation With Mao," p. 47.
168
Idem, "Talk With Chou," The New Republic, March 27,
1971, p. 22.
169Terrill, "China and World," pp. 45-46.
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on the Mainland under the control of the Peking regime.
action also caused Soviet uneasiness.

This

USSR's ambassador in

Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin, called Dr. Kissinger on the same
night "to find out the meaning of this outrageous verbal acThus, "without lifting a finger" Peking caused "a
170
."
ruffle between the'superpowers'

curacy."

The PRC's formal name was further used by President Nixon
in his 1971 foreign policy report to Congress.

Dr. Michel

Oksenberg,of Columbia University, recommended that sensitivity should be considered as a basic principle in the conduct of
new approaches to Peking.

The Chinese were categorized

as

sensitive people. "The President's reference to the People's
Republic of China is important," he said, "and let us be sen171
China."
sitive to Chinese feeling that there is only one
Undoubtedly, the President's new posture was appreciated
by the Chinese leaders whose country had been condescendingly
referred to as "Communist China" or "Red China" or "Mainland
China" for two decades, a long-standing symbol of a rebellious
group, which had been isolated from the international community.

ho matter what the American leader's connotation might

be, Peking had, at least, sensed the genuineness of the American intention for a rapprochement.
Public Sian and Secret Preparation
The year of 1971 was a watershed year in United States-

170Ibid., p.46.
171U.S. Relations with China, p. 292.
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Chinese relations.

It was the year that President Nixon an-

nounced his acceptance "with pleasure" of the invitation to
visit Mainland China.

The process behind the dialogue-

opening was a culmination of step-by-step measures over years.
Following up on United States' moves on the exchange of
scientific information and on the removal of restrictions on
American travel to the Mainland in early 1971, the Chinese unexpectedly extended their invitation to the American table tennis team, which was attending a world-championship gale in Japan.

With seven newsmen, the team travelled on the Mainland

for a week of friendly competition.

Their trip was seen 3s

opening "a new page in the history of relations" between the
172
two peoples.
Dr. Scalapino has indicated that Peking has often used
state-to-state or people-to-people or comrade-to-comrade re173
lationships to develop its relations with other countries.
Thus, Chinese ping-pong diplomacy seemed to be their first
active overture to Washington from the viewpoint of peopleto-people relationship.

In developing Chinese relations with

other countries, Chinese leaders were always reliant upon
such people-to-people diplomacy, in order " not to stress
their own direct military involvement as one of their techni174
It
ques for influencing events beyond their periphery."

172,.U.S. and China: The Thaw Starts--How Far Will It Go?"
U.S. News and World Report, April 26, 1971, p. 16.
173Rpbert A. Scalapino, "China and the Balance of Power,"
Foreizn Affairs 52 (January 1974): 349.
174U.S. Relations with China, p. 303.
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was also envisaged as a means of evaluating American responses
prior to escalating to a state-to-state relationship without
involving any government's commitment.

As far as the Chinese

leaders were concerned, steady friendship between peoples did
not necessarily imply good relationships between the two 8oviernments.

Peking could discontinue its approaches should an

intended result not be achieved.
In coincidence with the Chinese invitation to the United
States team, the White House announced a few hours later, on
April 14, 1971, the termination of the two-decade old embargo on trade with the Mainland China, which had been in ef175
For the first time, the direct
fect since the Korean War.
trade between the two countries was open.

Embargo had been

an instrument of American isolation policy toward China; but
the impacts of its ending on the improvements of WashingtonPeking relations could not be expected to be too great.

As

far as the Chinese leaders were concerned, the knot between
China and America was the "Taiwan question" which had been
placed

as

the foremost concern during the Warsaw talks.

Just as the United States put restrictions on trade with Communist countries, Peking always subordinated trade transactions to the improvement of diplomatic ties.

Peking had

been allowed to purchase goods from American subsidaries and
had acquired the items from other industralized Western countries.

Therefore, the end of the embargo would "represent

175China and U.S. Foreizn Policy, p. 23.
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176
Proonly a partial and minor abatement of hostilities."
fessor Stanley Lubman of the University of California at Berkeley, said that China had "no interest in direct Sino-American trade and preferred to discuss the more fundamental is177
He therefore suggested that
sues, particularly Taiwan...."
"unless the fundamental issues between the United States and
China are at last confronted after 20 years of tragic inertia,
a new trade policy will make little contribution to shaping
178
United States-China relations constructively along new lines."
While further publishing a general licence list for exports to China and authorizing imports from Peking in June
1971, President Nixon stressed his long-range goal of normalHe also expressed his desire to
179
visit Peking "somtime in some capacity."

izing relations with China.

Peking's ping-pong diplomacy speeded up President Nixon's
decision to have a summit meeting with the Chinese leaders,
which was mainly organized by Dr. Kissinger, the President's
foreign policy adviser.

Believing that a summit conference

180
new
a
course"
chart
to
and
deadlock
a
to
"break
able
better
was
than subordinates' talks such as the long and resultless War-
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saw talks,

Dr. Kissinger began to involve himself in the di-

plomatic approaches to Peking.
Taking advantage of a fact-finding mission regarding the
settlement of the Vietnam War, specially appointed by the President, Dr. Kissinger and three assistants secretly flew to
Peking for a three-day (July 9-11, 1971) talk with Chou En181
Their meetings worked out the procedure for the United
lai.
States forces' withdrawal from Vietnam and American consent to
182
Peking's seat at the U.N.
An understanding was reached that
no foreseeable incidents short of war would cancel President
163
1,ixon's visit after he had formally accepted.
The diplomacy of Dr. Kissinger's secret trip to Peking
reflected an unprecedented and unorthodox style by the Nixon
Administration.

The only possible explanation for it lay main-

ly in the risks of information-leaking.

The disclosure of the

Kissinger-Chou talk, if a failure, would gravely compromise any
successive attempts at contact between the United States and
China, and produce a disillusionment for their intentions to
reach an accommodation later.

"The secret Kissinger's trip

181Dr. Kissinger's three assistants were: John Holdridge,
Winston Lord, and Richard Smyser. Their trip to Peking was
highly secret; even Vice-President Spiro Agnew and Defense Secretary Melvin Laird were in the dark. President Nixon worked
out his China policy at the Lincoln Sitting Room, rather than
at his regular Oval Office. See "Nixon coup: To Peking For
Peace," Time,July 26, 1971, pp. 12-17.
182"hazards Along the Road to Peking," Time, August 2,
1971, p. 11.
183John Osborne, "China Gamble," The New Republic, August
& 14, 1971, p. 12.
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was the only way we could work it out," said Secretary Rogers.
"We weren't sure, of course, what the results of that visit
184
would be."
Thus, the United States allies except President
Yahya Khan of Pakistan, who had assisted in arrangement for
Dr. Kissinger's flight to Peking, were not consulted in advance.
Dr. Kissinger's visit to Peking was generally deemed as
successful because his trip revealed the flexible approaches
between Washington and Peking.

However, his style as a new

instrument of policy-formulating was criticized.

That Pre-

sident Nixon took a diplomatic coup to China through his main
adviser Dr. Kissinger, rather than his policy-executive Secretary Rogers, had undermined the latter's prestige as a traditional actor in the conduct of foreign policy.

He bypassed

Congressional scrutiny--Dr. Kissinger was not by statute obligated to testify in Congress.

This arrangement bypassed

the system of Congressional sharing in the foreign policy
process, thus stimulating Congressional mistrust of the President.

Senator J.W. Fulbright argued that "executive pri-

vilege" had overshadowed the "accountability" of the Presi185
dent.
The epoch-making day between the United States and Chinese relations came on July 15, 1971.

Four days after Kis-

singer's return from Peking, President Nixon announced his

184,1Secretary Rogers Reviews U.S. Objectives in the World,"
Department of State Bulletin 65 (July-Dec. 1971): 651.
185J.W. Fulbright, "The High Cost of Secrecy," The Progressive, September 1971, p. 17.
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acceptance of the invitation to visit the Mainland to seek
"the normalization of relations between the two countries and
also to exchange views on questions of concern to the two
186
However, he stressed that his visit "will not be at..
sides."
the expense of our old friends,"--referring to Nationalist
China, and that the trip "is not directed against any other
187
nation"--alluding to the Soviet Union.
The domestic response to President Nixon's upcoming trip
to the Mainland was

reported as "highly favorable."

Leading

personalities of the Republican Party were enthusiastic.

Even

right-wing members, who should have been expected to oppose
188
it, were surprisingly receptive. Dr. Fairbank praised it as
189
"a helpful and creative move."
The reconciling attitude of the United States toward Peking was further enforced by the Administration's declaration
on August 17, 1971,to support Communist China's seat at the
U.N., but to oppose any move to expel Nationalist China from
it.

The Department of State indicated that "there is much

sentiment in the United —ations in favor of the admission of
190
Peking.
Washington's formula was to provide that "two governments now exercise authority over territory and over peo-

186,,Nixon,s announcement to visit China," p. 121.
1871bid.
"Nixon's Coup: To Peking For Peace," Time. July 26,
1971, p. 16.
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plL who were given representation in the United Nations when
191
China ratified the Charter in 1945 as an original member."
Essentially, the United States proposal was a tentative "twoChinas" formula settling the China's representation in the
world organization.
The Genral Assembly of the U.N. passed on October 25,
1971, the Albanian Resolution replacing Nationalist China's
seat with Communist China.

Coincidently, Dr. Kissinger's

second six-day visit (October 20-26, 1971) for the arrangement for President Nixon's visit was taking place at the same
time as the U.N. voted on the China representation.
ger's

Dr. Kissin-

staying on the Mainland was seen as one of the main rea-

sons for Nationalist China's expulsion from the world organization.

Dr. Ray S. Cline, Georgetown University, stated that

his presence "signaled to the world that U.S. interest had
shifted to the People's Republic of China and, despite public
policy pronouncements, would be less resolute than before in
protecting the interests of its long-time ally, the Republic
192
of China."
Believing that "a 'good' China trip would put added pres193
sure on the Russians to be amenable on SALT,"
the United
Administration took more friendly, and avoided provocative,

191,,
A Legacy of Peace: Our Responsibility to Future
Generations, Addressed by Secretary Secretary Rogers," Department of State Bulletin 65(July-Dec. 1971): 440,
192Great Power Triangle, p. 214.
193,
Newhouse, p. 236.
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actions toward the Mainland prior to President Nixon's visit.
Intelligence-gathering flights over the Mainland were terminated; nuclear-equipped F-4's aircrafts were withdrawn from
194
These steps were designed to remove risks and obTaiwan.
stacles from the farther coming summit meeting lest the Soviet cancellation of President Eisenhower's proposed visit to
Moscow should be recurred,which had been due mainly to the U2 incident.

Meanwhile, on February 14, 1972, three days prior

to the President's departure for Peking, Communist China was
placed under the same trade restrictions as the Soviet Union
and other Eastern European countries.

China was allowed to

import

strategic goods from America-controlled firms in COCOM
195
countries without a Treasury licences.
The modification of
Washington's trade policy toward Peking indicated that the
United States was taking an "even-handed" policy toward China
and the USSR in the trade dimension.

It was "important to

keep the Chinese list matching the Soviet list," said Dr. Lubman, because where "there is a China differential there is a
196
residue of silent hostility."
In reciprocity, China also released two American prisoners, Richard G. Fecteau and Miss Mary Ann Harbert, and commuted John T. Downey's life sentence to a five-year imprisonment.

The Chinese understanding of Americans' strong feeling

194
George H. Quester, "Taiwan and Nuclear Proliferation,"
Orbis 18 (Spring 1974): 147.
195"Restrictions Eased on Exports to People's Republic of
China," Department of State Bulletin 66 (Jan.-June 1972): 291.
196U.S.
Relations With China, p. 278.

86
about the issues of prisoners was praised by President Nixon
as a "concrete result of our efforts to establish a dialogue
197
and a hopeful sign for future progress in our relations."
The President's Visit: The Shanghai Communique
President Nixon's visit to Mainland China was unique and
unprecedented; the trip was described as "the week that changed
198
the world."
Nixon was the first American President to visit
Communist China, with which the United States had no formally
diplomatic relations.

The eight-day trip (February 21-28,

1972) to the "Middle Kingdom" was by far the longest stay in
any other country of any President in American diplomatic his199
tory.
An entourage of more than 300 Americans including
eighty-seven newsmen reflected the American public's interest
200
in the President's trip.
The Shanghai Communique issued as
a result of the visit was the first document reached between
the two governments laying the basic principles for the future
improvement of their relations.

The normalization of relations,

since 1972, has replaced reconciliation or rapprochement in
the American posture concerning China.

The objective of the

President's visit was not merely to open communication, or to
open the door to the Mainland, but rather to advance normali-

197”Emerging Structure of Peace," p. 329.
198“Banquet Honoring President Nixon, Shanghai, February
27: Toast by President Nixon," Department of State Bulletin
66 (Jan.-June 1972): 432.
199 According to the established American practice, a President's visit to any country normally Listed two or three days.
200,'Nixon in China: Who Stands to Gain Most," p. 14.
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zation.
The Shanghai Communique signed by President Nixon and
Prime Minister Chou En-lai on behalf of their governments was
a statement by both sides regarding their views on the international affairs and stating the principles that would govern
their future relationship.

It illustrated their understand-

ings reached and difference discussed.
First of all, both of them had agreed that the five principles of co-existence would govern the conduct of nations in
international affairs, and that international disputes should
be settled without resorting to the use or threat of force.
By applying these principles to their mutual relations, they
stated their intentions to proceed toward normalization, to
reduce international military conflict, not to seek hegemony
and to oppose any nation or nations seeking hegemony in Asia,
and to conclude no agreement nor understanding which was di201
rected against other states.
It was the first time that the United States officially
accepted the Chinese five principles of co-existence, in contrast with Secretary Dulles' earlier denouncement of them.
As far as the Chinese leaders were concerned, these principles
were basic for Peking "to establish normal relations with all
the Asian and African countries, with all the countries in the
202
Peking had repeated its warning to America not to
world...."

201For the text of the Shanghai Communique, see Appendix A.
202
Alan Lawrance, China's Foreign Relations since 1949,
(London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), p. 163.
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interfere

in China's internal affairs.

Therefore, such prin-

ciples as respect for sovereignLy and territorial integrity,
and non-interference in each other's internal affairs referred
to China's position on settling the "Taiwan question." "Chou
203
was talking about Taiwan," when he mentioned those lines.
The stipulation of "non-hegemony" referred to the "Soviet
hegemony" in the eyes of Peking, but there was "no particular
country in mind when it was being drafted" said Dr. Kissinger.
He stressed: "The paragraph on hegemony will arise only if
204
country
should
seek
it."
any
Second, they were opposed to any country's collusion with
another nation against others, and to major nations dividing
up the world into sphere of interest.

This re-affirmed the

American claim that the effort to improve relations with Communist China was not directed against the Soviet Union.

Prior

to the visit, President Nixon had emphasized that the American
policy toward China was neither aimed against Moscow nor exploited the Sino-Soviet tensions.

Dr. Kissinger indicated

that "as far as the United States is concerned, our relationship with the People's Republic of China is not directed
205
against the Soviet Union...."

203John Osborne, "The Nixon Watch: Mission to China,"
The hew Republic, March 4, 1972, p. 9.
204N ews Conference at Shanghai. February 27. 1972. of Dr.
henry Kissinger and Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green,
Appendix to hew China Policy, p. 282. Hereafter referred to
as Kissinger-Green's News Conference.)
2°5Ibid.
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Third, Washington and Peking were in accord on maintaining state-to-state contact "through various channels" such
as by establishing a "contact point"--a form of Warsaw talks
--conducting exchanges in several fields, and trading in a
third country.

They also agreed that America would dispatch

high-ranking representatives to Peking from time to time for
the purpose of discussing particular issues of great import206
In this connection,
normalization.
ance and furthering the
Dr. Kissinger confessed that the two sides were "not exactly
equal."

Peking's sending a representative to Washington

might be regarded as "under the hypothesis" because of the
207
Washington.
in
remaining
Embassy
Nationalist Chinese
Finally, they agreed to develop people-to-people connection through the contacts and exchanges of science, technology, culture, sports and journalism broading the people's
Also the opening of direct trade was regarded
208
as beneficial to both sides.
understanding.

However, due to the differ -mces of their social systems
and foreign policies, there were some fundamental differences,
209
First, at the beginthough no polemics, in the Communique.
ning of the Communique, each side expressed its own general
principles with different views on the issues.

The United

206See the text of the Communique.
207Kissinzer-Green's News Conference, p. 281.
208See the text of the Communique.
2°9Ibid.
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States stated its commitment to support peace and stability in
the Asian region.

Communist China declared its theory of "wars

of revolution" or "wars of national liberation."

This section

reflected the view that each side was "more or less independ210
Hence, in the American text of the Coment of the other."
munique, the United States' position was stated first;

n the

Chinese text, China's position was first.
Second, the so-called "Taiwan question" was not settled
in the Communique.

In substance, Washington did not challenge

the position that the Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan
Strait maintained that there was but one China, of which Tai211
But for the process of settling this queswan was a part.
tion, there was no agreement between both sides.

Peking in-

sisted that the "liberation" of the island was its internal
212
affair, not "an international problem in any normal sense."
Washington, while re-affirming the "peaceful settlement" of
the question by the Chinese themselves--without resort to the
use of force--was prepared to "progressively reduce its forces
and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the
213
area diminishes."
The United States regarded the "withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Tai214
wan as "their ultimate objective."

210KissinRer-Green's News Conference, p. 279.
211See the text of the Communique.
')1 . .
2Kissinzer-Green's News Conference, p. 283.
213
See the text of the Communique.
214thid.

91
These lines regarding the "Taiwan question" were the most
critical, controversial, and ambiguous part of the Communique.

That this vagueness was intentional

was indicated in

the statement from the Department of State: "For clarity's
215
sake, we must preserve ambiguities."
They could be explained from various interpretations to justify any course of future United States-Chinese relations.

They could be inter-

preted to mean either that the American relationship with Taipei would remain unchanged, or that the United States would
proceed to recognize Peking and to sever diplomatic ties with
Nationalist China.
From the former interpretation, since the United States
did not yet recognize the Peking regime as the sole government of all China, of which Taiwan was a part, the fact that
the United States did not challenge the one-China claim did
not constitute a new American China policy at the expense of
Taipei.

Senator Barry Goldwater (R Ariz) indicated that "we

have not given away one single thing to the Red Chinese,"
and that "we will uphold our treaty commitments to the Tai216
wan government."
But from the latter's description, the United States had
implicited acceptance of the one-China concept on which Peking
would base its claim to sovereignty over Taiwan.

It was seen

as a far-reaching concession by Washington, symbolizing the
ending of the "self-determination" principle.

215New China Policy, P. 34.
216China and U.S. Foreign Policy, P. 4.

Conservatives
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in Congress criticized it as an abandonment of Nationalist China on Taiwan—abandoning the long-standing concept of "an in217
dependent Republic of China on Taiwan."
Senator Humphrey
criticized the United States' concession to Peking, in spite
of thL fact that "the people of the island of Formosa once as218
pired to determine their own destiny."
One thing the United States had agreed in connection with
the "Taiwan question" was its commitment to reduce or withdraw
forces from the island--one of the conditions which Peking had
lonE, proclaimed as necessary to improve United States-Chinese
relations.

However, Dr. Kissinger stressed in the news con-

ference that the withdrawal of American troops from Taiwan was
general policy and was conducted unilaterally not mutually in
the summit meeting.

As far as Washington was concerned, the

withdrawal of troops was related to the relaxation of tension
in the area--the area referred to being "the general area" and
not "any particular part of Asia,"--in the hope of trying to
219
reach a peaceful solution to the Taiwan problem.
In the American policy-makers' judgements, President Nix220
on's trip met near-universal approval.
His summit with the
Chinese leaders had set a procedure to guide efforts at normal-

217Ib1d.,pp.3-4.
218Ibid., P. 4.
219
Kissinger-Green's News Conference, p. 282.
22O••
China Policy and the East Asia Community: StateLent by ::arshall Green, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs," Department of State Bulletin 66 (Jan.-June
1972): 741.
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ization.

It re-established communication, though differences

remained after the trip; "without dialogue, they might never
221
It reduced hostility between the two countries
be bridged."
and hopefully helped prevent the reoccurence of American
volvement in Asian warfare.

in-

America had been engaged in the

three confrontations of War World II, the Korean War and the
Vietnam War in Asia in the last thirty years.

American com-

mitments to her allies such as Korea, Japan, and Vietnam remained valid, as declared in the Communique.
United States' policy toward Peking was intended to proceed in setting aside the "Taiwan question" while developing
the mutual relations.

Assistant Secretary Green stated: "Ue

hope Peking can come to be persuaded on this basis to set
aside the issue of Taiwan so we can explore the possibilities
for removing other sources of tension and improving relations
222
Therefore, while Washington expanded dialogue
between us.
and exchanges of contacts with Peking, the relationship between Washington and Taipei remained unchanged.

The American

defense comm tment to Taiwan, though deleted in the Communique, remained valid.

At the news conference, Dr. Kissinger

said that "this treaty will be maintained. Nothing has
223
From the American decisionchnaged in that position."
makers' point of view, Peking's consent to develop relations

221"Seeking a Peaceful World, Addressed by Secretary
Rogers," Department of State Bulletin 67 (July-Dec. 1972): 186.
-22 Future Strategy, p. 287.
223Kissinger-Green's News Conference, p. 281.
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with the United States before the "Taiwan question" was settled proved China's flexible posture toward Washington.
Moreover, an improved American relationship with China
would diminish tension on the Korean Peninsula.

In the Com-

munique, Peking had committed itself to settling international
conflicts without any force; previous practices have shown that
Peking was able to live up to its international obligations.
Therefore, North Korea could not count on Peking's support for
its risks.

Assistant Secretary Green pointed out: "I think

our rapprochement with China continues to the diminishing of
danger in Korea, because it must be clear to the North that
it now cannot count on getting wholehearted Chinese support
224
in a military adventure any more than Soviet support."
The trip caused the Soviet Union to accept the possibility of a close relationship between the United States and
Communist China.

Its dreams of making Washington-Peking

relations impossible lay buried.

Dr. Terrill said that "the

Russians no longer have the luxury of knowing that America
and China are out of touch.

That seems to me a very sub-

stantial gain, and a potential restraint on Russian activi225
ties in various parts of the world':
On the other hand, the President's visit was of great value to both the American and Chinese people.

Through communi-

cations such as American television and Chinese newspapers,

224New China Policy, p. 33.
225Ibid., p. 37.
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the peoples of the two countries achieved a better understanding of one another, providing the basis for mutual respect.
The "Fourth Estate" fully justified the President's trip; a
New York City cable television company unprecedently re-ran
226
The press predicted that the trip
twelve hours of his trip.
would have a very favorable effect on the Presidnet's re-elec227
tion. The Gallup Poll found that the visit had escalated President Nixon's popularity to a 56 per cent approval rating.
Vearly 70 per cent of the respondents praised the Peking tour
as either a very or fairly effective move in his conduct of
228
foreign affairs.
For the Chinese leaders, the President's visit had escalated China's role in world politics.

On the other hand, it

had a deterring effect on Soviet designs against Peking, and
encouraged other states, particularly those in Asia, to set
their courses toward rapprochement with the "Middle Kingdom."
It also strengthened those Chinese leaders who had supported, and offset those who had opposed, improved relations with
the United States.
however, the prospects for Increased people-to-people
contacts between China and the United States were marginal.
As a more isolated society than Russia, contacts and exchanges with China would be limited.

Peking would choose

to grant visas to those Americans who were "sympathetic with

226Chancellor, "China Show," p. 91.
227
"Idxon's Coup: To Peking for Peace," p. 16.
228
Chancellor, "China Show," p. 91.
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communism."

Also the prospect for trade was not bright.

For-

eign investment on the Mainland, symbolizing an aspect of foreign influences, would be least acceptable to Peking.

United

States resumpt!on of trade with the Mainland would compete
with other Chinese trade partners who IlLid long been on the
Chinese market because of the American embargo.

Dr. Lubman

predicted in 1971 that "the future dimensions of trade would
not amount to a very significant portion of American foreign
229
Moreover,
trade and perhaps even of Chinese foreign trade."
normalization--full diplomatic relations--would not likely be
accomplished as long as United States continued its relationship with Taipei and adhered to its defense commitment to ForDr. Edwin 0. Reischauer indicated that President's trip
230
left "the real Taiwan problem unchanged."

mosa.

The trip had "set up a process where common ground can be
231
However, :_lte Communique was a document
gradually expanded."
not legally binding on successive Administrations.

This was

because, from the United States constitutional point of view,
it lacked the force of a treaty or executive agreement.

Rather,

IL was a document that had established the course of United
States policy toward China.

Successive Administrations' ad-

herence to the Communique was based not on legal obligation,

229U.S.Relations with China, p. 279.
230New China Policy, p. 5.
231

President :sixon stated his Mainland trip to his Cabinet
members after his ..cturn. See William Safize, Before The Fall:
An Inside View of the Pre-Watergate White Louse, (isew York:
Doubleday & T;ompany, Inc., 1975), p. 410.
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but on the interests those Administrations would perceive in
the continuation of this policy.

Therefore, the Communique

had provided more latitude for American decision-makers to add
their own interpretation and conditions as they proceeded toward the normalization process with Communist China.

CHAPTER III
TOWARD NORMALIZATION: PROCESS AND OBSTACLES
President Nixon had succeeded in establishing contacts
with Communist China and brought about "a rising chorus of
232
However, he empraise" in America to his new China policy.
phasized that this trip had been "not an end in itself, but the
233
The Shanghai Communique had orilaunching of a process."
ented the basic direction of United States policy toward China which would be implemented through either expanding trade
and cultural exchanges or establishing diplomatic contacts
for the ultimate goal of accomplishing the normalization of
relations--meaning the establishment of formal diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level on a de 'tire basis.

"The

beginning of the process of normalization of relations with
the People's Republic of China,and its continuation in the
years since then," said Secretary Kissinger, "has not been a
matter of expediency but a fixed principle of American foreign
234
policy."

232China and U.S. Foreign Policy, P. 3.
233"Emerging Structure for Peace," p. 331.
234"Secretary Kissinger Makes Visit to the People's RePublic of China," Department of State Bulletin 71 (July-Dec.
1974): 906.
98
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Yet, the normalization process of United States-Chinese
relations had been interrelated with the "Taiwan question"
by Peking's leaders, who had indicated that the maintenance
of United States diplomatic and military ties with the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan interfered in their internal affairs and therefore obstructed normalization.

In the Communi-

que, the Chinese side stated: "The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization between China and
235
Peking had reiterated that the normalthe United States."
ization should be carried out on its terms: United States severance of diplomatic relations with ROC, abrogation of the
1954 United States-Republic of China Mutual Defense Treaty,
and withdrawal of American troops from Taiwan.

Peking's

stance on these conditions was never relaxed since the Warsaw
talks began in the 1950's.
The improvement of American relations with China was further endorsed and strengthened by Congressional leaders' follow-up visits to Peking, which had previously been arranged
during President Nixon's trip.

The first visit was by Senate

Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D Mont.) and Minority Leader
liugh Scott (R Pa.) from April 19 to May 3, 1972, and then by
House Majority Leader Gerald R. Ford (R. Mich.) from June 23
to July 8, 1972.

Visits by such high level Congressional de-

legations created bipartisan support for, and underlined the
cohesiveness of the executive and legislative branches in,
the evolution of relations with Peking.

2355ee the text of the Communique.
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In Mr. Ford's report, the future President stated that
the United States diplomatic relations with ROC was "a par236
Not only would
ticular barrier to normalized relations."
it frustrate Chinese people-to-people contact with the Americans, but also the expansion of trade, the establishment of
news agencies, and Peking's dispatch of students to America
for study would all be related to the "Taiwan question."

He

the conclusion that "...We simply recognize the in237
accurate impression that there is not one China, but two."
drew

The report reflected his personal support for the normalization, though it did not materialize in his presidential
term.
Formalization of the Contacts:
The Liaison Offices
In trying to set the "Taiwan question" aside, the United
States Administration was proceeding to seek normalization
with Peking.

As far as the Chinese leaders were concerned,

normalization on the basis of the principles of the Shanghai
Communique would inescapably resolve the "Taiwan question."
Representative Lester L. Wolff said: "According to the Chi238
years."
4
in
be
to
normalized
supposed
were
nese, relations
American-Chinese relations advanced to a great step as
a result of Dr. Kissinger's two visits to Peking in 1973
(February 15-19 and November 10-14).

His February trip led

to Washington-Peking determination to expand trade and ex-

236Great Power Triangle, p. 160.
237Ibid.

238Ibid., p. 203.
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changes in science, culture, and other fields.

The most con-

crete achievement was the agreement to establish a liaison
office in the near future at each other's capital, whose functions would broaden the contacts and exchanges in all fields,
covering "the whole gamut of relationships' handling not only
other matters,except the strictly for239
Other than that, Peking
."
relationship
the
of
mal aspects
trade but also "all

showed its good will to normalization in releasing two Amen 240
The
Smith.
E.
Philip
and
Flynn
J.
Robert
can prisoners,
property problems, consisting of American private claims of
$ 197 million against China, and Chinese assets amounting
to 78 million which were blocked in the United States, were
seen by both sides as a first priority in negotiations leading to expansion of trade and to granting "most-favored-nation"(i.iFN) status to Peking.

i'he "Taiwan question" remained

unsettled short of United States reducing troops on the island.
The establishment of direct communication,such as the
liaison office in 1973, replaced diplomatic contact through
a third country, and marked an epoch in the process of normalIt "marks the transition in Sino-American relations
241
from largely personal diplomacy to institutional diplomacy."
ization.

239"Presidential Assistant Kissinger Visits Asia: Transscript of News Conference," Department of State Bulletin 68
(Jan.-14ar. 1973): 314.
240/bid.
241Francis O. Wilcox, ed., China and the Great Powers:
Relations with the United States. the Soviet Union. and Jan, (New York: Prager Publishers, 1974), p. 67.
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The liaison office headed by a chief without formal diplomatic rank was literally not a formal diplomatic mission.

How-

ever, given the diplomatic privileges and immunities with the
liaison office, coupled with no restriction on the staff, it
seemed that such an office was as much as a regular diplomatic mission.

Moreover, code was allowed

used

for the mes-

sage delivery between the liaison office and each other's
government indicating the "trust and cordiality" between the
242
1/
It was a very meaningful step," said Sec.
two countries
retary Rogers, although it was "different than having diplo243
China.
with
"
relations
matic
The United States relations with China were further advanced by Dr. Kissinger's November trip, his first visit to
Peking as the American Secretary of State, in which the scope
of the functions of the liaison office was
brace those conducted by embassies.

expanded to em-

In addition, both sides

agreed in the communique following the visit to extend the
non-hegemony area from the Asia-Pacific region to "any other
244
Further evidence of the flexible pospart of the world."
ture of Peking on the normalization process was shown by its
modification of the previous position that normalization
could be realized "only on the basis of confirming the prin-

242n Edging Toward a Great Leap, Newsweek, March 5, 1973,
P. 17.
243u Secretary Rogers Interviewed on 'Face the Nation',"
Department of State Bulletin 68 (Jan.-June 1973): 378.
244"Joint U.S.-P.R.C. Communique, November 14," Department of State Bulletin 69 (July-Dec. 1973): 716.
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245
ciples of one China."
Peking's agreement to establish such a "quasi-embassy"
was a significant llodification and concession to the process
of normalization, in view of the fact that Nationalist China's
Embassy still remained in Washington.

It was seen as a momen-

tous achievement of Nixon-Kissinger's new China policy, in
comparison to Japan's "Trade Mission" stationed in Peking
prior to the 1972 normalization of Peking and Tokyo.

In this

regard, China's strained relationship with the Soviet Union
still played a pivotal role in Peking's willingness to set the
"Taiwan question" aside, for the purpose of counterweighting
Soviet pressures, either physically or psychologically.

Dr.

Cohen stated: "President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger have every
reason to be proud of this significant diplomatic success,
although they are obviously aware of the contribution that
246
Soviet hostility toward China has made to their achievement."
Since the Shanghai Communique was issued, the ominous
Soviet threats to the Mainland did not diminish but rather
mounted.

The Chinese leaders, being extremely realistic, be-

lieved that to accelerate a better relationship with the
United States was their best alternative Lo lessen the pressures from their main adversary.

Tactically, the block to

normalization, the "Taiwan question," could be temporarily
set aside.

Consideration for their national security de-

manded that they improve relations with Washington.

245Ibid.

246Wilcox, pp. 66-67.
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First of all, the atmosphere along the Sino-Soviet border
remained tense, which was testified by occasional incidents
and clashes such as five Soviet soldiers being killed at the
247
SinoAsia
on
:;ovember
25,
1972.
Central
Gate
in
Dzungarian
Soviet border talks since October 1969 were still in a dilemma.

The Chinese request for the amendment of the "unequal

treaties" established during the Czarist period was refuted
by Noscow.

While opposing Peking's suggestion to withdraw

each other's forces from the border for the talks, Noscow reinforced its mechanized troops from thirty to forty divisions
in 1971, to forty-nine divisions in 1972 and fifty divisions
248
in 1973.
Thus one third of the whole Soviet army was stationed on the Eastern border, also the tactical air strength
of the Soviet Union was increased fivefold.
The purpose of the massive Soviet military build-up on
the border, in addition to the prevention of a Chinese attack
on iloscow because of China's growing nuclear capability which
had surpassed Britain and France, was mainly to exert constant
and maximum pressures on Peking, awaiting a change in the power structure in Peking in which a pro-Soviet faction would
come to power.

This was based on some evidences of instabili-

ty in the Peking's leadership as shown from the purge of narshal Lin Piao in 1971.

At the Tenth Congress of the Commun-

ist Party in 1973, the conflicts between Chou En-lai and Iladame

247Sino-Soviet Chronology, p. 190.
2481bid., pp. 188 & 190.
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This allowed Hoscow to expect that their con-

surfaced.

flicts would make China's foreign policy uncertain; a possible
success of the radicals might slow down Sino-American detente;
and gains of a military-bureaucratic coalition could lead to
Sino-Soviet detente.

Thus, Chou, as an espouser of Sino-Amer-

ican relations, could enforce

his stance on detente with the

United States by the establishment of the liaison office and
oscow's pressures.

also frustrate

Dr. Carl A. Linden, of

George Washington University, stated: "Without discounting
the possibility of a Soviet invasion of China at some critical
juncture in their relationship, it is also important to realize that Brezhnev's massive border army has already served
him not only as a powerful political and diplomatic lever
against Peking but also as a means of pressure on a not overly
249
stable Chinese leading group."
Second,

oscow was attempting to contain China, strategi-

cally and politically, on the basis of its Asian Collective
Security System.

The Soviet-Indian Friendship Treaty of Au-

gust 1971 was seen as a cornerstone for USSR's system.

Since

then, Soviet Pacific Fleets, based at Vladivostok,with modernized equipment, became more active throught the Pacific and
Indian Oceans.

In order to encircle Peking from the Indian

Ocean, the Soviet :.avy had established a training base on the
250
Its ships began to operate in the
east .oast of India.
Strait of i:alacca and adjacent areas, threatening Chinese

249Asian Rivals, p. 20.

2)0loid., p. 138.
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shipping to their allies in Africa such as Tanzania and ZamDr. G. Paul Holman indicated: "Threats along the Strait

bia.

of Malacca are a way to discredit Chinese foreign policy, to
make life difficult for the Chinese economically, political251
strategically."
ly, and
The increasing Soviet naval activities in the Indian
Ocean caused much concern in Peking and Washington alike,
because these activities could be directed toward taking action against China or monitoring Amerian Polaris Submarines
patrolling within the range of Soviet targets.

The demons-

tration of improving relations :Jetween Washington and Peking
would be a signal to counterbalance the Soviet power in this
area.

Therefore, both governments agreed to expand the "non-

hegemony" clause to "any other part of the world."
Third, the rumor that the Soviet Union was playing with
the idea of a pre-emptive attack on the Mainland was revived
by the circulation of a document, the "Samokhin paper': in
West Germany in August 1973.

There was stated: "Today...war

with China...a victorious war, is the most pressing and prin252
Premier Chou En-lai
cipal aim of the Soviet government."
warned in the Tenth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party
on August 24, 1973,that China "must beware of a surprise at253
Peking even gave no response to a
tack by the Soviets."
secret proposal of Mr. Brezhnev to conclude a non-aggression
treaty between the two countries.

Thus, Soviet threats to

251Ib1d., p. 137.
252Sino-Soviet Chronology, p. 192.

25
3Ibid.
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China's national security and its possible attack on the Mainland still preoccupied the Chinese leaders' policy planning
formulation.

it was the United States that was the only major

power which could deter a Soviet attack on China.

Therefore,

an understanding was reached in Dr. Kissinger's trip that Washington would provide military assistance to China in the event
of Soviet attack, or would deter and prevent such as attack
through diplomatic channels, and that Peking was willing to pur254
Dr. harold
chase some kinds of American military hardwzre.
C. hinton said: "The U.S. Government is, of course, opposed to
a Soviet attack on China, and quite rightly so since the Chinese
would, presumably, lose in some sense in that war and since the
stability and security of the Far East would be very seriously
jeopardized or destabilized, as has always been the case in the
255
past when China was unduly weak or victimized by a foreign power."
Fourth, the uaceasing diatrib s between Moscow and Peking
in each other's newspapers were extended to the Security Council of the United Nations.

The U.N. became the main interna-

tional arena for their accusations.

Their relationship reached

the lowest level when the Soviet Union was charged on August
12, 1972, with involvement in the late Defense Minister Lin
256
Lin
Piao's conspiracy for trying to assassinate Chairman Mao.

254T.C. Rhee, "Peking and Washington in a New Balance of
Power," Orbis 18 (Spring 1974): 152-153.
255Asian Rivals, p. 3.
256Sino-Soviet Chrono1oRvp P- 189.
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had been crushed with his airplane in Outer Mongolia somewhere
on September 12-13, 1971, in the aftermath of his abortive
coup.

As a pro-Soviet in the Chinese leadership

d irl drchi-

tect of opposition to Chou's detente policy with Washington,
Lin's purge reflected that there would be fewer obstacles for
Peking to continue improving relations with Washington.
Finally, Moscow was charged with interfering in Chinese
internal affairs.

Peking decried the Kremlin's attempt to

collude with Taipei to create "Two Chinas."

In 1968, Peking

began to accuse the Soviet Union of espousing the Nationalist
257
Im"country."
Taiwan
describing
a
as
Chinese government by
mediately after Dr. Kissinger's visit in February 1973 declaring
the establishment of the liaison office, Peking suggested talks
with Taipei on the unification of China.

In reference to the

Soviet Union, Peking warned that for those leaders on Taiwan
who had deemed the L;nited States unreliable and wished to rely
on "someone else, this is not only absurd but absolutely impos258
Peking's statement was a response to the reports that
sible."
the Soviet Union had made overtures to Taiwan such as by "unofficial Russian emissaries," and that KGB agent Victor Louis had
visited Taiwan, thereby "touching off rumors of a possible Mos259
The report of Russian i,ovisti
cow-Taiwan rapprochement."

257Sino-Soviet Chronology, pp. 175 & 160.
258
Lawrance, p. 233.
259Salisbury, p. 184.
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ews Agency bulletin in October 1973 regarding "the actual existence of Lwo Chinas" and laiwan as an "independent and stable
entity' was a grave challenge to Peking's stance on the "Tai260
Peking was concerned about the probability
wan question."
of Taipei's switch toward Moscow when four Soviet naval vessels passed through the Taiwan Strait on Nay 12, 1973.
Linton regarded it as

Dr.

a psychological counterblow" to the

assumption of the post by David Bruce, the first Chief of American liaison office in Peking, who arrived in China just three
261
however, the rapprochement of Moscow-Taipei
days later.
seemed to be viewed as most unlikely.

The former United

States Ambassador in Taipei Walter P. :tcConaughy indicated
that the leadership in Taiwan "has a deep and abiding hatred
262
Union."
Soviet
the
and distrust of
In so far as Peking was concerned, the more cordial relationship between Peking and Washington in the spirit of the
Shanghai Communique would be a corollary to the 1esse3ed relations between Washington and Taipei, thereby downgrading
ationalist China's status in the international setting.
Thus, the advantage of Peking's desire to improve relations
with Washington would raise "the prospect of progrcss on the
263
Taiwan question."

260sino-Soviet Chronology, p. 192.
261Asian Rivals, p. 8.
262Great Power Triangle, P.240.
263Ibid., p. 155.
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Under such circumstances, Secretary Kissinger's visit in
1.ovember 1973 advanced American-Chinese relations beyond the
principles of the Shanghai Communique.

Their cooperative

areas were broadened to the extent that economic relations
would be enlarged to develop China's potential oil deposits
in the offshore oil fields--"an enterprise potentially upsetting to the global economic and political balance of pow264
and that the United States would assist Chinese agrier";
265
Ltegarding the normalization process, Peprograms.
cultural
king's stance on the "one China" principle remained unchanged;
China was flexible in her tactics without mentioning Washington's severence of diplomatic ties with ROC and ending its commitments to Taiwan.
Confirming that the American-Chinese relationship was not
"a passing fancy," Secretary Kissinger stressed at the farewell banquet in Peking in November 1973 that Washington-Peking relations should be continued, "no matter what happens
in America" and "regardless of the Administration "--refer266
America.
in
affair
Watergate
the
ring to the emerging of
-'or the Chinese leaders, the present phase of the relations
would create a political climate in the United States such
267
that "no succeeding Administration can reverse course."

264Rhee, "Peking and washington in
Power Balance," p.153.
265Ibid.
266"China: Delphic Diplomacy," Newsweek. November 26,
1973, p. 53.
267Ibid.
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Standstill in the 1,ormalization Process
Ever since 1973, the pace of the United States' process
of normalization came to a standstill without any tangible
improvements.

Given the drastic changes in the American do-

mestic environments and the Chinese leaders' link of trade
and exchanges with the normalization process, the implications
had stalled their furthering relationship.
First of all, the Watergate affair had weakened the Administration's ability to take further steps in the normalization process.

To revive the American public trust in the

Administration, rather than to proceed with ,lormalization,
became the top priority in the policy-making process.
Second, the United States was approaching the 1976 Presidential elections which diminished the prospects for American improvement in its relations with Peking.

President Ford's

pledge to the "commitment to the principles of the Shanghai
268
was challenged greatly in the primary campaigns
Communique"
by his opponent Ronald Reagan, who had expressed his strong
support for ROC and opposition to the normalization of relations with China.

In Congress, the Nathis Resolution of

November 15, 1975, introduced by Rep. Dawson :•iathis (D. Ga.)
ad supported by 214 congressmen, declared that "the U.S.
should not comprom:se Nationalist China's freedom while it
269
prior to
mainland,"
the
with
pursued improved relations

268"President Ford Pledges Continuity in Foreign Policy,"
Department of State bulletin 71 (July-Dec. 1974): 334.
269Facts on kilo Inc., Facts on File, 3 (December 13,
1:75): 925.
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President Ford's visit to Peking(December 1-5, 1975).

Ihe

i.esolution reflected that 'there are a lot of us in Congress
270
that still support Taiwan and its government."
Third, the American public attitude was still opposed
to normalizing relations with Peking under its terms.

The

Gallup survey reported in 1975 that the majority objected to
normalization subject to Peking's conditions, and that almost
half of the respondents espoused the American military commitment to Taiwan, although half of them still favored Amen 271
The survey reflected that
can normalization with Peking.
the public was more in favor of maintaining diplomatic relations, than of adhering to military commitment to the ROC.
The public reaction, in this connection, was in coincidence
with Taipei.

Dr. Cohen stated: " I should say that I was told

in the Republic of China that their preference would be that,
if we have to choose between withdrawing diplomatic relations
and withdrawing our defense commitment, they would feel more
272
However,
confident if we withdraw the defense commitment."
United States decision-makers were concerned with the security of Taiwan in the aftermath of normalization.

Dr. Whiting

270
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, United States-China Relations: The Process of Normalization of Relations. Heraings before the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on International
Relations. 94th cong., Cong., 1976. p. 155. (Hereafter referred to as Normalization Process).
271The Gallup Organization, Inc, A Gallup Study of Public Attitudes Toward Nations of the world, (New Jersey: The
Gallup Organization, Inc., 1975), pp. 9-20.
272Great Power Triangle, p. 292.
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said that Washington "places greater stress on the impact of
breaking our treaty as compared with ending our diplomatic
273
ties."
Finally, the striking debacle of South Vietnam taken over
by the North Vietnamese in the spring of 1975 led President
Ford to re-assess at this juncture whether it was opportune
for America to carry out normalization, thereby abandoning
another United States' ally in the Asian region.
Under such circumstances, in spite of the fact that "the
State Department made a serious effort to persuade the President to recognize Communist China or at least to agree to rec274
the second American President's
ognize Communist China...."
trip to Peking did not bring forth the accomplishment of diplomatic relations with Peking, only re-assuring the American
good faith in completing the normalization on the basis of
the Shanghai Communique.

Peking was informed that the United

States detente with the Soviet Union at Vladivostok in 1974
for the SALT II was not directed against China.
The Chinese leaders, taking into account the transition
period of the United States domestic politics during the 1976
Presidential election, did not expect to normalize relations
during President Ford's visit.

Presumably because the obsta-

cle to normalization was not cleared away, no communique was
issued.

Neither side was willing to change its position on

t1-1- "Taiwan question" with the exception that Peking would

273Normalization Process, p. 141.
274
Great Power Triangle, p. 233.
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accept the "Japanese model" as a formula for their normalization.

Secretary Kissinger stated on December 4, 1975,at a

news conference in Peking that "I think the Chinese have made
clear that the general model that they want is something sim275
ilar to the Japanese model."
According to this formula, if
and when Washington and Peking normalized their relations, Peking would be recognized as the sole government of China;
Washington's diplomatic relations with Taipei would be terminated, while cultural, commercial, and financial connections
would be maintained.
The expansion of Soviet influence in the Asian area and
in other parts of the world remained a major concern in the
Chinese leaders' thinking.

The fall of Vietnam had fairly

strengthened Soviet influence there.

The unification of Viet-

nam with her military potential could become the main part
in the Soviet Asian Security System in counterpoise against
Peking.

The Chinese leaders, therefore, in contrast to their

previous opposition to American troops on the Asian Continent,
made no secret of supporting the continuation of the American
military presence in Thailand, Japan, the Philippines, and
West Europe to counterbalance the Soviet strategic power.
Secretary Kissinger stated: "They (the Chinese leaders)
understand that the United States must inevitably be a major
part of such an equilibrium.

For this reason, they do not

want to open up Asia to the aspirations of other countries

275flSecretary
Kissinger's News Conference at Peking December 4," Department of State Bulletin 73 (July-Dec. 1975)
: 929. (Hereafter referred to as -Kissinger's News Conference")
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276
For
whose intentions toward them might be less benevolent."
the Chinese leaders, a strong and unified Western Europe, tied
with America, would not only provide a powerful counterbalance
to Soviet influence in Europe, but also constrain its ability
to exert military pressures on China.

Cooperation between

Washington and Peking in Asia would offer a momentous balance
against the Soviets' Asian Collective Security System.

As-

sistant Secretary Philip C. Habib indicated that "they (the Chinese leaders) have not concealed the fact that the attitude of
Western Europe, Japan, and the United States, with respect to
the Soviet Union, is of interest to them.

They make that known
277
to every journalist, every Congressman, every vistor that comes."
On the other hand, from the aspects of trade and exchanges
as instruments to improve Washington-Peking's relations, the
normalization process since 1973 was also in a stalled situation.

Essentially, the United States was taking step-by-step

measures in the conduct of the normalization process, through
expanding trade and cultural exchanges, to finally establishing
diplomatic relations with Peking.

Therefore, since the Shang-

hai Communique, a number of high-ranking American officials
visited the Mainland, including two American Presidents, Dr.
Kissinger on eight occasions, and several tours of Congresional delegations.

From 1971 to 1975, about 10,000 to 12,000

276,,Exclusive Interview, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
: 'We Are iloving Into a New World," U.S. News & World Report,
June 23, 1975. p. 24.
277,
,ormalization Process, p. 116.
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private Americans such as scholars, journalists and professionals visited the "Middle Kingdom." These visits were mostly arranged by American private organizations such as the Committee
on Scholarly Communication and the National Committee on United
States-China -elations, facilitating the cultural exchanges between the two countries.
Washington-Peking's trade transactions grew since the termination of the embargo in 1971.

The total amount of trade

was $ 5 million in 1971, rising to $ 935 million in 1974; Amer278
ica became China's second trade partner, next only to Japan.
Also America was on the favorable side in the trade transac279
The National
Lions, "almost 8 to 1" America's favor in1974.
Council for United States-China Trade and its counterpart in
China, the Chinese Council for the Promotion on International
Trade (CCPIT), were coordinating in the promotion of the trade
between the two countries.
however, Peking took different views from those of Washington regarding normalization in trade and cultural exchanges.
The Chinese leaders regarded trade and cultural exchanges and
normalization as inseparable.

They pragmatically manipulated

trade and exchanges as instruments in the pursuit of their
goal of normalization.

With these intentions in mind, Peking

admitted American businessmen for the first time to participate in the Canton Trade Fair in 1972.

Commercial officers

were assigned to the liaison office and Chinese imports of
American grain grew from zero before 1971 to one million tons

278Ibid., p. 72.

279Ibid.
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in 1972, four million tons in 1973, and three million tons in
280
1974.
Just as the Japanese had been rewarded with increasing
trade with the Mainland since their normalization of relations,
so Peking was evaluating the United States expansion of trade
and increase of cultural exchanges in terms of the normalization process.

The stalled pace of the United States normali-

zation process from 1973 onward contributed to the Chinese
lukewarm response to further improvement of trade and cultural
exchanges.
The most evident sign of Chinese disappointment at the pace
of the normalization was Peking's cancellation of 1975 grain
purchases from America.

This cancellation dropped Washington-

Peking trade to about $ 450 million, nearly a 50 per cent re281
duction as compared with 1974.
Peking criticized the improvement of Washington-Taipei relations such as approval for
adding two more ROC's consulates in America in 1974 as "undisguised interference in China's internal affairs and a fla282
grant violation of the Shanghai Chinese-American communique."
Dr. Barnett indicated: "The drop this past year (1975), I
would say, has some economic explanations but also is a reflection of their (Chinese) political decision to slow down
283
on developing bilateral relations until normalization occurs."
United States' industrial goods exports to China comprised only
3 to 5 percent of the Chinese total importation of such goods.

280/bid., p. 20.

281Ibid., p. 73.

282/bid., p. 143.

283Ibid., p. 166.
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The absence of normalization resulted in Peking's reluctance
284
America.
from
goods
such
more
import
to
Beyond that, Peking leaders had regarded the trade with
America as not on the basis of "equality and mutual benefit,"
as mentioned in the Shanghai Communique.

In addition to the

imbalance with America, Peking was dissatisfied with the nonMFN status it still had.

Chinese products such as foodstuff

and handcrafts on the American market were mostly less competitive, because they were subjected to duties as much as
four or five times higher than those from some other countries.
The United States tariff treatment of China was seen as discrimination on political, psychological, and economic grounds.
Should their products be imported under the MFN status, their
importation would "result in a 20-percent increase," in the
judgement of Christopher H. Phillips, President of the National
285
Council For United States-China Trade.
The United States' stance on granting MEN status to China
was interrelated with the settlement of the assets claims, in
which American private property on the Mainland totaling about
$ 197 million had been nationalized.

Similarly, Chinese assets

amounting to $ 77 million were frozen in America as a result
of the Korean War.

Without solving the assets problems, any

measures to improve trade such as credits and loans to China,
opening of the direct commercial banking connections, operating
aviation and maritime services between the two countries, and
contemplating China's trade exhibition in the United States

284Ibid., p. 21.

285Ibid., p. 99.
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could not be conducted.
Peking's position on the assets problems was tied firmly
with normalization.

The Chinese leaders expressed no serious

desires to Jettle these problems until normalization.

They

regarded assets and MFN status as "minor matters," that would
286
Therefore,
"take care of themselves after normalization."
there would be no settlement of assets problems, let alone the
trade improvement without the normalization.

Dr. Alexander

Eckstein, of the University of Michigan, said that "they (the
Chinese leaders) will not permit a significant rise in trade
287
with the United States short of formal diplomatic relations."
Regarding exchanges, the Chinese leaders preferred peopleto-people contacts, rather than state-to-state visits.

The

Chinese were realistic enough to dispatch mostly scientific
groups to study American advanced science and technology; or
some arts group

and sports team to cultivate the Chinese im-

age in the American public.

No high-ranking officials from

the nainland came to the United States because of the absence
of normalization.

"They (the Chinese leaders) don't want to

visit Washington," said Secretary Kissinger, "until full
288
Even the United States
normalization has been achieved."
suggestion of student exchanges or long-term visits for research and of the establishment of the news agencies at each
other's country was denied because of the lack of diplomatic
recognition.

286/bid., p. 167.

287Ibid., p. 23.

288,1Kissingers News Conference," p. 931.
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The American step-by-step approach to normalization received little response from Peking, particularly after 1973.
The "Taiwan question" was for Peking the fundamental issue
to the normalization process.

Dr. Barnett stated that "the

Chinese took the position they were not prepared to move on
any issues, even minor ones--on expanding exchanges, on signing an assets and claims agreement, things we would have like
to gone ahead with anyway.

They took the position, implicit-

ly, that if you cannot move on Taiwan, we will not move on
289
anything else."
Arguments for Completion of Normalization
Since the Shanghai Communique, little opposition to
normalization with China appeared in America, either from the
public or from the American China experts.

Secretary Kissinger,

while declaring bipartisan support for normalization, had stressed that "the normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China is a permanent and essential element in our
290
foreign policy."
Dr. Whiting indicated that "in the Amen 291
can scene there is .proad consensus supporting normalization."
The platforms of the two Parties in the 1976 Presidential campaign concurred on the desirability of improving relations
with Mainland China.

:.ormalization was not a subject in the

289Normalization Process, p. 163.
29°"Secretary Reiterates U.S. Goal of Normalized U.S.P.R.C. Relations,' Department of State Bulletin 71 (July-Dec.
1974): 6.
291N,ormalization Process, p. 162.
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campaign debates.

Thus it appears that United States normali-

zation of relations with China has become a well-established
foreign policy since the Nixon Administration, so long as the
Shanghai Comwunique was endorsed by the American Government.
President Carter, in

his address to the U.N. on :darch 17, 1977,

said: "We recognize our parallel strategic interests in maintaining stability in Asia and will act in the spirit of die
292
(n the characteristic ec,iicacy of
Shanghai Communique."
diplomacy, the term of "strategic interests" seemed to be deemphasized, particularly in the public statements.) Dr. Cohen,
a member of President Carter's policy task force in the campaign, indicated: "We should not repudiate the Shanghai Communique.

This would be tragic.

We would have a serious de-

terioration in our relations with the People's Republic of Chi293
na.
On the part of Ciiina, Peking's leaders had also expressed
their desires to accomplish normalization as soon as possible.
Peking was not satisfied with the present stage of its liaisonoffice relationship with Washington.

"Not until ambassadors

are formally exchanged will Peking be satisfied," said Dr.
Cohen, "that the United States had finally put Sino-American
294
relations on the same plane as Soviet-American relations."
Peking even forwarded some Americans to make demonstrations
in the big cities of America on the occasion of the anniver-

292
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saries of the Shanghai Communique creating the political climate to complete the full normalization.

Organizations which

had some trade and cultural exchanges connecting with China
were also encouraged to request that American decision-makers
accomplish normalization.

In so far as the Chinese leaders

were concerned, extension of United States recognition to Peking would be a symbol of its attaining unrestricted international status and prestige.

It would acknowledge as legiti-

mate Peking's interests on the Mainland and also bring domestic legal consequences--the government in Peking, rather than
that in Taipei, would be accepted as the Government of China
and Taiwan's legal status would become that of a province of
China, under Peking's sovereignty.
Both Washington and Peking are caAnitted to accomplish
normalization as the final goal in the improvement of their
relations.

however, before normalization could be achieved,

the two sides had to find conditions under which both could
agree to a solution for the central issue--how to settle the
"Taiwan question."
Peking in the Shanghai Communique had refuted any arrangements such as "one China, one Taiwan," or "One China,
two governments," or "two Chinas," or "independent Taiwan,"
or "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined."

In a

nutshell, "one China" policy was Peking's basic and uncompromising condition to normalization; such a policy was ?eking's unflexible condition in the previous establishment of
relations with about 110 countries.

As to the legal status

of Taiwan, some countries such as Britain recognized it as
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China's territory; some countries such as Japan and Canada just
understood or noticed China's position on Taiwan.
A "One-China" policy was also maintained persistently by
the Republic of China on Taiwan, which had suspended its diplomatic ties with those countries which had switched to Peking.
Thus, of the about 140 nations in the world, not any single
country had diplomatic relations at the same time with Peking
and with Taipei.

When any country wished to establish relations

with China, the only alternative was either Peking or Taipei,
because both of them had insisted on a "one-China" concept as
the basis of their foreign policy.

Secretary Kissinger replied

"no" at a news conference on November 10, 1975 to the possibility of having diplomatic relations simultaneously with the gov295
circumstances.
any
Peking
under
erment of Taipei and of
If and when America accomplishes

its normalization with

Peking, the first corollary would be the de-recognition of .:0C.
This would be a severe blow to Nationalist China, damaging her
international status and prestige and demoralizing the people.
She would probably become

even more isolated because, of the

about twenty countries still maintaining relations with her,
some would probably switch their posture to Peking just as
many countries had switched their recognition to Peking when
Taipei was expelled from the U.N. in 1971.

The United States

is the only major power which still maintains diplomatic ties
with Taipei.

America and Nationalist China have historical

295"Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of November 10,"
Department of State Bulletin 73 (July-Dec. 1095): 781.
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and emotional connections dating from their alliance against
Japanese aggression during the War World II.

The impacts of

de-recognition of Taipei as the government of China might create a "Nixon shock" on Taiwan.
The second consequence, which would be interrelated with
the first corollary of the de-recognition of Taiwan, would contribute to terminate the 1954 mutual defense treaty between
the United States and Nationalist China.

Peking, as the legi-

timate successor government of China after normalization, would
be unable to accede to it.

Since the conclusion of the treaty,

Peking has denounced it as illegal and an infringement of its
sovereignty, and expressed "the most vehement opposition to"
296
it.
Dr. Terrill said: "As for the treaty, Peking would take
297
From the view point
the view that it had ceased to exist."
of international law practices, the treaty made by a previous
government could not be continued unless the successor goverment would accede to it.

Dr. Cohen stated: "One reason for

the termination automatically of the defense treaty, if we
sever our diplomatic relations with the Republic of China,
would be that we would no longer have a treaty partner at the
other end of the commitment.

The successor government would

be the People's Republic in Peking.

That Government, which

has always denounced the treaty as being void from the start,
is not about to accede to the commitment to defend territory

296
Lawrence, p. 53.
297Ross Terrill, "Peking, Taiwan and the USA: Triangles
Have Three Sides," The New Republic, November 1, 1975, p. 16.
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298
it claims to be its own against an attack by itself."
As far as the treaty per se was concerned, the political
value of it would be eliminated by normalization, since it
could no more be continued as an arrangement which had been
directed against Communist China's action.

President Eisen-

hower, while requesting the Senate's consent and advice to the
treaty, stated that the treaty "is defensive and mutual in character, designed to deter any attempt by the Chinese Communist
regime to bring its aggressive military ambitions to bear
299
against the treaty area." There would be no further rationale
for the validity of the treaty.

Thus, one-year's notice to

terminate the treaty as stipulated in Article X would be applied.

Dr. Cline, the former Director of Intelligence and R,-

search at the Department of State, said: "I believe the State Department takes

the view it is entitled to drop a treaty of

this kind without any particular congressional action.... That
is the only basis on which they could change their position
300
without consulting the Congress."
The termination of the treaty would exclude legal basis
on which the United States could take measures to defend Taiwan and the Pescadores, unless other alternative arrangements
were made,

should Peking resort to the use of force to settle

its "lost territory" question.

The United States military com-

mitment to Taiwan had created a deterrent to China's attempt

298Great Power Trianzle, p. 291.
299Eisenhower, islessage, p. 308.
300Great Power Trianzle, p. 224.
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to gain control of the island; its giving up this commitment
could not only create a new situation in the treaty area but
also impair the American credibility of commitments in Asia.
It was Sino-Soviet tension that had diminished the Chinese aspirations for taking military risks against Taiwan, in addition to their vulnerable amphibious and air capability over
the 100-mile Strait as well as the strengths of the self-defense of Taiwan.
Nonetheless, the abrogation of the treaty would represent
the American abandonment of an ally in Asia.

When t:le treaty

was signed in 1954, Secretary Dulles stated that "the signing
of this Defense Treaty will put to rest once and for all rumors and reports that the United States will in any manner
agree to the abandonment of Formosa and the Pescadores to Corn301
munist control."
The psychological impacts on the Chinese
on Taiwan would be conceivably grave.
The third result of normalization would be to raise the
problem of sovereignty over Taiwan.

Traditionally, the United

States had regarded sovereignty over Taiwan as an "unsettled
302
question subject to future international resolution."
The
fact that President Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet to patrol
in the Taiwan Strait since 1950, when the Korean War had broken
out, was based on this policy.

The United States position on

Taiwan rested on international agreements such as the 1951 Jap-

301Eisenhower, 1.1essaze, p. 314.
302
Background Papers on Taiwan, Appendix to U.S. Relations
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anese Peace Treaty and the 1952 ROC-Japan's peace treaty, which
stipulated that "Japan renounces all right, title and claim to
Formosa and the Pescadores," without ceding "to any particular
303
However, the latter was declared "to be terminated"
entity."
by Japan when Tokyo and Peking normalized their relations in
19/2.
The Department of State declared in 1969 that "the United
States recognizes the Government of the Republic of China as
legitimately occuping and exercising jurisdiction over Taiwan
304
Thus, a new situation of the jurisand the Pescadores."
diction over Taiwan and the Pescadores would be brought about
when the United States withdrews its recognition of the Nationalist Chinese government on Taiwan.

Besides, the Taipei

Government's claim to be the only government of China, representing China as a whole, would be eroded.
Since the Shanghai Communique, United States troops have
been withdrawn from Taiwan gradually; the force of 10,000 in
1972 had decreased to 2,700 by the end of 1975 when President
Ford visited Peking.

The withdrawal was expected to continue

until there was a complete pull-out.

Assistant Secretary Habib

stated: "We have been doing it steadly, and we will continue
305
As to another two conditions which Peto do so steadily."
king had sustained, they were in essence two sides of a coin.
As soon as normalization is accomplished and ilashington recog-

303Ibid.
304Background Papers on Taiwan,
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nizes Peking as the sole legal government of China based on the
"one-China" principle on which Peking has insisted, the American defense treaty with ROC would be inescapably terminated.
Peking's "one-China" policy could not be expected to be flexible.

Dr. Cohen said: "The People's Republic is not prepared

to make an exception for the only major holdout--the United
306
States--even if Taiwan is."
As far as the American China experts were concerned, it
was argued that normalization was in the United States interests and should be an inescapable trend for Washington's
The present stage of Washington-Peking
307
When former Defense
relations was "a thin relationship."
policy toward Peking.

Secretary James Schlesinger came back from his 23-day visit
in Peking in 1976, in coincidence with Chairmen Nao's death,
he indicated: "At the moment, our relations with the Chinese
308
The normaliin a diplomatic sense are correct but cool."
zation process could not be delayed for an indefinite period.
First of all, normalization was a reflection of United
States realism in the conduct of its policy toward China,
formally recognizing the facts of life on the :-Iainland that
nearly one billion people were ruled by the Peking government.
“ormalization would facilitate the stability of the Chinese
structure of relationship in which those Chinese leaders who

306
Jerome Alan Cohen, "A China Policy For the Next Administration," Foreign Affairs 55 (October 1976): 31.
307Great Power Triangle, p. 178.
308,,
Inside China Now: Report on 23-Day Visit by James
Schlesinger," U.S. News & World Reoort, October 18, 1976, p.42.
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had adhered to improving relations with Washington would be
strengthened; and those who criticized Washington as delaying
in the fulfillment of the commitment to the Shanghai Communique
Normalization was a means to eliminate

would be diminished.

the controversies and debates among Chinese leadership about
their foreign policy toward Washington.

Since Mao's passing

away, the Peking regime has been proceeding in the direction
of stability.

Schlesinger said: "Stability is essential to

them (the Chinese leaders), and I look for near-term stability
309
Normalization would enleadership."
Hua's
under Premier
hance Chinese political stability in the transitional period
of Peking's leadership and reduce Soviet influences in Chinese
internal politics.

Chinese stability was a main factor in the

structure of the five-power international system.

Dr. Cohen

said: "None of us wants to torpedo that (Taiwan), Yet it is
27 years since the People's Republic was established.

Can we

finally establish formal relations and go on with normal di310
plomatic process with Peking?"
Second, normalization was an instrument to maintain balance in the international order, a durable and long-term
goal for American foreign policy.

Both Washington and Peking

had determined to refrain from hegemony, and had agreed to
play a constructive component in the world-wide equilibrium.
The further improving relationship between the two countries

309Ibid., p. 40.
310Great Power Triangle, p. 282.
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would be a vital element in preserving this equilibrium.

As-

sistant Secretary Habib explained: "A fundamental goal of U.S.
foreign policy is to promote an international order of peace,
justice and prosperity for all.

In pursuing this objective,

our approach proceeds from the premise that peace depends on
a stable global equilibrium.... The normalization of U.S. relations with the People's Republic of China is a crucial ele311
ment in preserving this equilibrium."
The United States' improved relations with China have
apparently contributed to equilibrium in Asia, reducing the
conflicts in this area.

Peking even endorsed American mili-

tary presence in the Asian nations allied with the United
States such as Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and Thailand.
The tension on the Korean Peninsula after the collapse of
South Vietnam was eased when North Korean leader Kim II-Sung
was dissuaded from under taking any venture against South
Korea as a result of his visit to Peking in May 1975.

The

proposal for gradual withdrawal of American troops from South
Korea envisaged by the Carter Administration would need China's cooperation.

Dr. Whiting said that "...we should ex-

haust all our diplomatic efforts tr, having a multilateral
understanding and the arms that will go into the Korean Peninsula over the future 5 or 10 years.

It is very difficult

to ask Peking to act in effect, in a way that might compromise
the interests of Peking, unless we have already normalized re-

311Norma1ization Process, p. 106.
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lations and met some of the prior Chinese interests in the
312
area.
In the Asian-Pacific area, American interests were
in harmony with those of Peking, short of the "Taiwan question."
Third, from the viewpoint of the United States in a middle position in the triangle relationship between Washington,
Moscow, and Peking, the normalization of relations between
America and China would reduce incentives for Sino-Soviet rapprochement, diminishing the possibility of Peking's shift to
the Soviet's side.
and

Since the Sino-Soviet split, both Peking

oscow have sought detente with Washington, taking more

flexible posture to improve relations with America, such as
the exchange of liaison offices by Peking and Washington and
the Soviet-American SALT.

Furthermore, their split had di-

verted Soviet pressures on Europe and facilitated Ame-ican
military disengagement from Asia.
On the other hand, Sino-Soviet rapprochement would not
be in American interests, even if not impairing those interests for the short-term.

Since Mao has left the scene,

Moscow attempted to signal interest in rapprochement with Peking, particularly with the leadership in the military fields,
with little response.

Peking even declared the party-to-par-

ty connection between the Chinese and Soviet Communist Parties have ended.

Normalization of the Washington and Peking

relationship would strengthen Peking's continous determination to counter Soviet pressure for improving their relations.

312Ibid„ p. 173.

132
Dr. Terrill stated that "the big issue is the growth of Soviet
power; US-China Lies are an important counter to it; the time
to develop them is now, because there will be pressure in China during the 1980s for a thaw with the Soviet Union if China
313
and the US have not begun genuine cooperation by then."
Th
United States' detente policy with the Soviet Union was still
in uncertainty; normalization with China would make Moscow
more inclined to detente.

Dr. Cohen indicated: "The United

States should realize that normalization will put pressure
upon Noscow to behave more cautiously, if not more cooperative314
ly, toward the United States."
Strategically, Mr. Schlesinger
said, "it is important to the United States that China remains
sufficiently strong to deter Soviet attack.
315
China is valuable to us."

The strength of

Furthermore, normalization would reflect the American
"even-handed" policy toward the two giant communist countries.
It would be a start to develop progressively better relations
with botn of them in the triangular relationship.

:Ir. Winston

Lord, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of
State, said: "Our interests compel us to pursue our well-established policies of seeking improved relations with both
316
U.S.S.R. and China."
however, if no more improving relations

313Terrill, "Peking, Taiwan and U.S.A.," p. 16.
314Cohen, "China Policy," p. 29.
315"Inside China Now," p. 42.
316Great Power Triangle, p. 156.
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between America and China emerge, "there could be gradual de317
The Chinese leaders, particularly those resistterioration."
ing rapport

with America, might re-assess the value of the

present stage of relations between the two countries.

Actual-

ly, they had suspected that Peking was used by Washington more
as an instrument to convince ::oscow to be flexible to Washington in SALT I, rather than as an element that strengthened
their determination to withstand Soviet pressures on the ilainland.

Their suspicion was alerted by the fact that Soviet mis-

biles, which could reach the Mainland but not the United States,
remained uncontrolled.

In such connection, if there were no

concrete measures taken by Washington to assure improvement
of the relations, Peking might consider taking a flexible posture toward the Kremlin, easing the Soviet military build-up
on the border.
Finally, the accomplishment of normalization could expand the trade and cultural exchanges between the two countries, because Peking's stance on foreign trade and cultural
exchanges was shaped by its foreign policy.

Chinese economic

policy of "self-sufficiency" and "self-reliance" made foreign
trade a rather small sector of the economy; western industrialized countries such as the West Luropean nations and Japan
had provided Peking with the items, including strategic goods
and technology.

The Americans were told by Chinese officers

in charge of trade that "trade is not really the problem"-

317
:.ormalization Process, p. 132.
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referring to the "Taiwan question" being the basic issue, and
that "some trade increases may now be possible, but after

318
normalization the indication was much more would be possible."
Assistant Secretary Habib stated that nothing particular
short of normalization" would raise Pc,king's interest in the
Sino-American relations, much less the American granting MFN
status and cultural exchanges.

The Chinese sense of cultural

supremacy accounted for their little interest in improving
cultural exchanges.

Without normalization, therefore, there

could be no prospect of furthering cultural exchanges or of
the establishment of a news agency for the internal reporting
of current China.

After normalization, Dr. Cohen said, "We

may get a trade agreement.

We may get a settlement of prop-

erty claims which we have been awaiting for a long time....We
will get some improvement, I think, in our travel, cultural
exchanges and general journalistic and diplomatic efforts to
319
Chinese
life."
of
functioning
the
about
learn more

318Great Power Triangle, p. 178.
319Ibid., pp. 253-254.

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
In the "five-power" configuration of international politics, the United States is the only power which has not yet
normalized its relations with China.

The present stage of

Washington-Peking relations remains uncertain; no normal relations can be developed until Peking's claim to the Government of China is formally and legally recognized by America.
Since the Shanghai Communique is so ambiguous concerning
American policy toward China, the Communique could only be
regarded as a transitional arrangement, rather than a permanent basis for their relations.

The liaison offices which

were established are still restricted in their activities.
As long as the United States conceives its policy in
terms of an international system based primarily on five balancing powers, and recognizes China's role for American security and interests, especially in counterbalancing Soviet
expansion and in fostering American policy in the PacificAsian region, normalization with China will be an inevitable
trend.

Only in such a situation will America go on progress-

ively developing better relations with both China and the
USSR, while consolidating her traditional alliances with Japan and West European countries.
In the Chinese leaders' views, Taiwan was a part of Chinese territory as expressed in the 1943 Cairo Declaration and
135

136
confirmed by the 1945 Potsdam Declaration, that "Manchuria,
Formosa, and the Pescadores shall be restored to the Republic
of China."

Therefore, United States' present maintenance of

diplomatic ties with, and honoring its defense commitment to
Taiwan, together with keeping troops on the island, were perceived as indicating that America had actually separated Taiwan from the Mainland politically, legally, and militarily.
In the views of the Chinese leaders, those who had tied the
"Taiwan knot" had the responsibility to untie it, or at least,
to take a "hands-off" policy toward it.
Nainland China had diligently succeeded in creating nearly universally a political perception that Peking is the sole
government of China.

This "one-China" concept has resulted

in her taking over ROC's seat at the U.N. and in the establishment of diplomatic ties with most countries on this basis.
Should Peking take a flexible posture toward America, its
"one-China" principle could no longer be followed.

The is-

suance of the Shanghai Communique had not ruled out Peking's
theory of "war of national liberation"; it will, therefore,
be very unlikely that Peking will give up its "one-China"
principle in the normalization process with the United States.
Except for countervailing Soviet pressures on the Mainland, two main purposes affected Peking's intentions to improve relations with Washington; entering the U.N. and settling the "Taiwan question."

The latter was the Chinese lead-

ers' dream of unification of China virtually and completely
and therefore could not be put aside in the normalization
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process.

They had positively responded to the United States'

policy toward Japan, the American military presence on the
Asian continent, and opposed Soviet strategy over the world.
But on the "Taiwan question': they showed no concession to the
United States; rather, they played it down as a minor matter,
unworthy of blocking normalization, expecting the accomplishment of normalization on their terms.

Without settling it,

no further business could be transacted, as was indicated on
the occasion of President Ford's visit to Peking in 1975.

Dr.

David J. Finkelstein, a Ford Foundation program officer, said:
'The government's East Asia specialists agree, however, that
the United States cannot afford to help perpetuate a territorial dispute with a nuclear-armed China, which by the 1990
will have a population of more than 1.25 billion highly nationalistic people.

They also recognize that this consider-

ation outweights any short-term loss resulting from a break
320
in formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan."
Ever since the establishment of the liaison offices in
1973, the Chinese leaders had repeatedly suggested the "Japanese model" as an acceptable formula for normalization.

In

this case, Japan has recognized Peking as the sole government
of China and "fully understands and respects" Peking's stance
on Taiwan that it is a part of Chinese territory, in compliance with the Potsdam Declaration.

While the diplomatic ties

320David J. iinkelstein, "Taiwan Won't Just Crumble When
U.S. Severs Ties,' Los Angeles Times, January 30, 1976.
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between Tokyo and Taipei were terminated, Japanese relations
with Taipei in financial, trade, and cultural matters were
maintained.

As a matter of fact, all non-communist countries

who had recognized Peking still maintained or even expanded
their commercial and financial relations with Taiwan.

Nr.

Carter during his presidential campaign endorsed the "Japanese model" for settling the "Taiwan question."

A similar

formula would most likely be a basic one to accomplish normalization.
Thus, if and when Washington normalizes its relations
with Peking, it must be expected that the diplomatic relations
with Taipei might be severed, while the trade, financial, and
cultural connections would be preserved.

The U.S.-ROC defense

treaty for which there is no place in the "Japanese model"
would become invalid in the aftermath of Washington's de-recognition of Taipei as the government of China.
American China experts have viewed the desirability of
normalization in terms of American national interest.

how-

ever, there should be also an assessment of Peking's national
interest involved in the normalization with America.

Given

the fact of unceasing tensions on the Sino-Soviet border, and
the S rategic Arms Limitation Talks in which Peking's interests, if at all, could only be taken care of through Washington, not Moscow, Peking's needs for this normalization might
be stronger than those of the United States.

Under such con-

sideration, normalization could appear as a necessity for Peking whereas for Washington it would be a convenience, though
a splendid one.

If this assessment is correct, the United
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States, as the Western world's major power, seems not necessarily to be in a position in which normalization could be
obtained only under Peking's terms.

Why should Washington

not work out an American model to normalization? Alas, it
seems as if normalization under the conditions demanded by
Peking is all but a foregone conclusion.
So far Peking has refused to rule out the possibility
of seeking to recover its "lost territory" by the use of force.
Therefore, the impact of the abrogation of the mutual defense
treaty on the stability of Taiwan would be grave, particularly psychologically, although not physically in the short-term.
American commitment had reduced the Taiwan Strait crises and
particularly guaranteed the investments from Western industrialized countries, especially Japan, West Germany, and Britain,
and oil-producing Saudi Arabia, as well as from overseas Chinese.

These investments played a crucial role in Taiwan's

growing prosperity.

In order to maintain its prosperity, some

viable substitute for the security Taiwan has enjoyed in the
past, thanks to the American defense commitment, can be expected to develop.

Dr. Fairbank pointed out: "If the end of

the security treaty meant turning Taiwan over to Peking's
leveling control, many would brand it a major crime even for
321
the 20th century."
The Chinese on Taiwan, thanks to the far higher and ever
increasing standard of living, provide a striking contrast

321"Normalization Relations With China," The Wall Street
Journal June 15, 1976.
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to those on the Mainland.

Per capita income of the former rose

from $ 132 in 1952 to $ 697 in 1974, as compared to the latter's
322
So, we can see
rise from $ 45 20 in 1952 to $ 117 in 1974.
that the standard of living enjoyed by the people of Taiwan, is
some five times higher than that of those on the Mainland.

More-

over, the social structure and adherence to the traditional Chinese culture, norms, personal values, aspirations, ways of life,
and individual thinking have made the Chinese on the island comp'etely different from those on the Mainland, who live under the
impersonal rigidities and permanent thought reform of the Maoist variety of communism.

The Taiwan Chinese are much more sim-

ilar to those overseas Chinese residing in democratice countries.
United States' normalization of relations with Peking would
be a great challenge to the lb million people on the island.
The main concern would be the security of Taiwan by which prosperity and the chance of political liberty could be preserved
Realism demands that Taiwan should be expected to make the
utmost effort to enhance her oefense capability to a degree of
self-sufficiency. Some complex thoughts concerning the future
and security of Taiwan have come into discussion in America.
They open, however, another complex topic, beyond the scope of
this essay.

'ROC Per Capita Income 5 Times Mainland's," China Year
197b,
(Taipei: China Publishing Co., 1976), p 7.
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'•
The Text of the Joint ComrsiunicluiI'
Silan-Ltai
Ff/ibiwini! 1.1 the text of the joint communique:, ismied
at Shanvhai on February 28. at 11w conclusion of President Nttiat's historic visit to the People's Republic of
hina:
President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation
of Premier Chou En-lat of the People's Republic of
China from February 21 to February 28, 1972. Accompanying the President were Mrs. Nixon, U.S. Secretary oh State William Rogers, Assistant to the Prcsulent
Dr. Henry Kissinger, and other American officials.
President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tsetung of
the Communist Party of China on February 21. The two
!cadets had a serious and frank exchange of views on
Sino-U.S. relations and world affairs.
During the isit, extensive, earnest and frank discussions were held between President Nixon and Premier
Chou En-lai on the normalization of relations between
the United States of America and the People's Republic
of China, as well as on other matters of interest to both
sides. In addition. Secretary of State William Rogers and
Foreign Miniser Chi Peng-fei held talks in the same spirit.
President Nixon and his party visited Peking and
viewed cultural, industrial and agricultural sites. and they
also toured Ilangehow and Shanghai where, continuing
discussions with Chinese leaders, they viewed similar
places of interest.
fhe leaders of the People's Republic of China and the
United States of America found it beneficial to have this
opportunity, after so many years without contact, to
present candidly to one another their views on a variety
of issues. They reviewed the international situation in
which important changes and treat upheavals are taking
place and expounded their respective positions and attitudes.
The U.S. side stated: Peace in Asia and peace in the
world requires efforts both to reduce immediate tensions
and to eliminate the basic causes of conflict. The United
States will work for a just and secure peace: just, because it fulfills the aspirations of peoples and nations for
freedom and progress; secure, because it removes the
danger of toreign aggression. The United States supports
individual freedom and social progress for all the peoples
of the world, free of outside pressure or interventio
n.
The United States Mieves that the effort to reduce tensions is sersed by improving communication between
countries that have dillerent ideologies so as to lessen
the risks of confrontation through accident, miscalculnlion or misunderstanding. Countries should treat each
other with mutual respect and be willing to compete
peacefully, letting performance be the ultimate
No
country. •hould claim intallibility and each countiv should
he prepared to re-esamine its own attitudes tor the common good. 1 he United States stressed that the peoples of
Indochina should he allowed to determine their destiny
without out.ide intervention; its constant oilman/ objective ha, been a negotiated solution; the eight-point
proposal put focward by the Republic of Vietnam and
the Fnitial States on January. ?7. 1972 repre..ents a ha'is
for the attainment of that objectiye; in the
allsenee of
liqoltated •.ettleinetit Ike 1 mitoil States env
is:o•es the ultimate w itlultaw al of all U.S. lorces trout the region con-

10

sistant with the aim of self-determination for each country
of Indochina. 1 he United States will maintain its close
ties with and support lor the Republic of Korea; the
United States will support ellorts of the Republic of
Korea to seek a relaxunon of tension and increased communication in the Korean peninsula. The United States
places the highest value on its triendly relations with
Japan; it will continue to develop the existing close bonds.
Consistent with the United Nations Security Council
Resolution of December 21, 1971, the United States
favors the continuation of the ceasefire between India and
Pakistan and the withdrawal of all military forces to
within their own territories and to their own sides of the
ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir; the United States
supports the right of the peoples of South Asia to shape
their own future in peace, tree of military threat, and
without having the area become the subject of great
power rivalry.
The Chinese side stated: Wherever there is oppression,
there is resistance. Countries want independence, nations
want liberation and the people want revolution—this has
become the irresistible trend of history. All nations, big
or small, should be equal; big nations should not bully
the small and strong nations should not bully the weak.
China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind. The Chinese side
stated that it firmly supports the struggles of all the oppressed people and nations for freedom and liberation
and that the people of all countries have the right to
choose their social systems according to their own wishes
and the right to safeguard the independence, sovereignty
and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose
foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion.
All foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own
countries.
Thc Chinese side expressed its firm support to the
peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in their efforts
for the attainment of their coal and its firm support to
the seven-point proposal of the Provisional Revolutionary
Government of the Republic of South Vietnam and the
elaboration of February this year on the two key problems in the proposal. and to the Joint Declaration of the
Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples. It firmly
supports the eight-point program for the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the Government of the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea on April 12,
1971, and the stand for the abolition of the "U.N. Commission for the Unification anJ Rehabilitation of Korea."
It firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of
Japanese militarism and firmly supports the Japanese
L's desire to build an independent, democratic,
peaceful and neutral Japan. It firmly maintains that India
and Pakistan should, in accordance with the United Naturns resolutions on the India-Pakistan question. immediately yy it:idraw all their forces to their respective territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in
Jammu and Kashmir and firmly supports the Pakistan
Coyernment and people in their struggle to preserve
their independence and soeLsretf.:111,' and the people of
Jammu and Kashmir in their strugrle for the ri!.:ht of selfdetermination.
There are essential differences Fetween China and thc
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United States in their social systems and foreign policies.
However, the two sides agreed that countries, regardless
of their social systems, should conduct their relations on
the principl,.s of re.pect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other
states, non-interference in the inteinal affairs of other
states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on this
basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. The
United States and the People's Republic of China are
prepared to apply these principles to their mutual relations.
With these principles of international relations in mind
the two sides stated that:
—progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests
of all countries;
—both wish to reduce the danger of international
military conflict;
—neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific
region and each is opposed to efforts by any other
country or group of countries to establish such
hegemony; and
—neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any •
third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.
Both sides are of the view that it would be against the
interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or
for major countries to divide up the world into spheres
of interest.
The two sides reviewed the lone-standing serious disputes between China and the United States. The Chinese
side reaffirmed its position: The Taiwan question is the
crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal
government of China; Taiwan is a province of China
which has long been returned to the motherland; the
liberation of laiwan is China's internal affair in which
no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S.
forces and military installations must be withdrawn from
Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any
activities which in at the creation of "one China. one
Taiwan." "One China. two governments." "two Chinas."
and "independent Taiwan" or advocate that "the status
of Taiwan remains to be determined."
The U.S. side &elated: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait
maintain there is but oil,: China and that Taiwan is a
part of China. The United States Ciovernment does not
challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese
themsehes. With this prospect in mind. it :Wilms the
ultimate oa
I ,ecii% e. et the ithdr:mal of all U.S. forces
and military insiallataels twin Taiwan. In the meanti:ne.
it will proeressisely reeia.e its forces and military lust:illations on Taiwan :Is the tension in the area diminishes.
The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden
the understanding between the two peoples. To this end.
they discussed specific areas in such fields as science.
teelinoltigv. culture. sports and journalism. in which NoPk-to-people conta•ts and eNehaa r.,..„ mould be mutually
beneficial. Each side utak itake• to laeilitate the unifier
deyelopment of such einn..ets and exchanges.
Both sales siew
tt,id as another area (tom
which mutual Ih.nent 4..in be (lensed. and agreed that
economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit
WADI 1977

arc in the interest of the peoples of the two countries.
They agree to facilitate the progressive development of
trade between their two countries.
The two sides agreed that they will stay in contact
through various channels, including the sending of a
senior U.S. representative to Peking from time to time
for concrete consultations to further the normalization of
relations between the two countries and continue to exchange views on issues of common interest.
The two sides expressed the hope that the gains
achieved during this visit would open up new prospects
for the relations between the two countries. They believe
that the normalization of relations between the two countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world.
President Nixon, Mrs. Nixon and the American party
expressed their appreciation for the gracious hospitality
shown them by the Government and people of the People's Republic of China.

Green Visits Asian Nations
Marshall Green. Assistant Secretary for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs. accompanied President Nixon on
his historic visit to China during the period February
21-28.
Following the visit Mr. Green was
designated by the President to visit
13 other Asian nations for detailed
discussions with senior Goyernment
officials of these countries on the
•-•
President's visit and on other bilateral
matters.
During the final day in Shanghai.
the President. Secretary Rogers and
Mr. Green conferred at length on the
President's discussions with the Chinese leaders.
Mr. Green flew directly from Shanghai to Japan on February 28. aboard the first American
plane to make such a flight in more than 22 sears. Atter
leaying Japan Mr. Green % ;sited Korea. the Republic of
China. the Philippines. Viet-Nam. Cambodia. Laos.
ihadand. Si,il,s sta. Singapoie. Indonesia. Australia and
New Zealand.
.Accompany hie the A...ski:jar secretary %%ere Mrs.
lolm 11. 1101.111.1A: Am! l'aid
Cneen.
.‘..i.tant to Mr.(ircot
:tut lied tO
.1.1Grivornt 1111S
IF •
Lti
4111,
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TEXT OF TREATY
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